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ANTITRUST AND TIE NEW ECONOMICS
LEE LOEVINGER*
PROTECTION of the public against the economic power of those in
control of property or trade is one of the oldest, if not the oldest,
principles of law. The earliest code of which any substantial written
record exists is that of Hammurabi, dating from the twenty-first
century B. C. One of the most remarkable features of this code is
the extensive provisions it contains fixing prices and charges for
services and seeking to protect the people against scarcity and over-
reaching.' An edict of the Roman Emperor Zeno in the year A. D.
483 prohibited any price fixing combination or monopoly whether
under claim of a royal grant or otherwise, and provided as punish-
ment forfeiture of all property and perpetual exile. 2 An early penal
code of China provided that any one guilty of monopolizing or
otherwise restraining the market in rice to gain an exorbitant profit
should be punished with eighty blows on the back for each offense.3
The earliest reported English case condemning restraint of trade
was in 1415; it was held that a contract seeking to diminish com-
petition by binding one party not to engage in a particular trade
was void.4 Although this was a civil case, according to existing
reports, the judge emphasized the view he took of the matter by
remarking, "Per dieu! If the plaintiff were here, he should go
to prison until he had paid a fine to the king !" In 1602 the English
courts declared that all monopolies were contrary to law-a deci-
sion which required considerable courage in view of the fact that
the monopolies then being asserted consisted of royal grants of
exclusive trading privileges.5
*Member of the Minnesota Bar.
Copyright 1953 by Lee Loevinger, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. William Seagle, Men of Law 26 (1947).
2. Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 191, 347 (1949).
3. Ibid.
4. Id. at 9; The Dyer's Case, 6 Year Bk. 5, 2 Hen. V, pl. 26 (1415).
5. Id. at 11. The Case of the Monopolies, Darcy v. Allen (1602) 8 Coke
125; Noy 173; Moore 673; 11 Coke 84.
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The reasoning of the court in 1602 in interesting for its contempo-
rary relevance. All monopolies are bad, the opinion held, for three
reasons: "(a) That the price of the same commodity will be raised
for he who has the sole selling of any commodity may and will make
the price as he pleases. (b) That after the monopoly granted, the
commodity is not so good and merchantable as it was before, for the
patentee (monopolist), having the sole trade, regards only his
private benefit and not the commonwealth. (c) It tends to the im-
poverishment of divers artificers and others, who before, by the
labor of their hands in their art or trade had maintined themselves
and their families, and who now will of necessity be constrained
to live in idleness and beggary." The court noted that the grant
of monopoly recited that it was done for the public weal. However,
since the court had demonstrated that the monopoly was not in
the public interest, it followed that the queen must have been
deceived in granting the monopoly, and therefore it was void.
Shortly after this, in 1623, Parliament enacted the Statute of
Monopolies specifically declaring all grants of monopoly void, with
the exception of patents to inventors giving them a monopoly of
their inventions for a period not exceeding fourteen years.6 By the
time of Blackstone's Commentaries, monopolizing and any com-
bination to raise prices were recognized as offenses against the
public trade, along with forestalling, regrating, engrossing, cheat-
ing and usury.7 Blackstone stated the common law to be that
monopolies were punished by the award of treble damages and
double costs to those who might be injured by them.
The rivalry of the European nations to establish colonies in
America, as Adam Smith pointed out, arose largely from the desire
to establish a monopoly of trade with the colonies for the benefit
of the "home" industries." The profit gained by the colonizing coun-
try, was, of course, at the expense of the colony; and this led to
hostility, opposition, and, finally, revolution. The "Boston Tea
Party" was an expression by the colonists of opposition to a
monopoly of the sea trade by the British East India Company.
6. St. 21 James I, c. 3 (1623).
7. IV William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (4th
ed., 1769) chap. 12. The offense of "forestalling" was buying merchandise on
the way to market, or directing it from the market, for the purpose of raising
the price. The offense of "regrating" was buying of victuals in a market and
selling again in the same market at a higher price. The offense of "engross-
ing" was getting possession of subtantial amount of victuals with the intent
to sell them at a profit. Blackstone states that, "Monopolies are much the
same offence in other branches of trade, that engrossing is in provisions. ...
(page 159).
8. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 574, 595 (1776: Modern Library
ed. 1937).
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Probably the greatest single cause of the American Revolution was
resentment against economic exploitation and opposition to
monopoly.9
TEEF, CLASSICAL THEORY OF ANTITRUST
The rule outlawing monopoly and restraint of trade was well
established in the common law by the time of the American Revolu-
tion. However, like the many similar rules of earlier legal systems, it
was a practical response to the felt necessities of economic living,
and had little, if any, theoretical rationalization. But at the very
time that the American colonies were declaring their independence
of Britain and struggling to throw off the shackles of its mercantile
monopolies, the theory of a free economy was also being announced.
It was in 1776 that Adam Smith published his great treatise,
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
Quickly acclaimed by scholars and men of influence, this work
has probably been more influential in shaping both the thinking and
the conduct of men since its publication than nearly any other book.
Smith covers the whole area of what has since come to be dealt with
as the field of economics, drawing upon extensive observation of
actual conditions, using a wealth of illustrative example, engaging
in close analysis of economic cause and effect, and, finally, con-
structing a comprehensive theory of economic behaviour. It is a
measure of the greatness of his achievement that practically all
economic analysis since that time, even that of Marx and the
socialists, has taken his theories as a point of departure; either
building upon, modifying, or "refuting" them.
The wealth of a nation, Smith says, is the product of its total
annual labor which, in turn, is the fund which originally supplies
the nation with all that it consumes, consisting either of produce of
that labor or purchase from other nations out of the produce. The
productivity of labor, which differentiates wealthy from poor na-
tions, depends upon the division of labor and its employment in
the most efficient tasks and manner. This, in turn, depends upon
the establishment of an efficient system of exchange whereby those
whose labor is engaged in producing a single commodity may be
able to secure commodities produced by those engaged in other
kinds of production. The system of exchange is the familiar one of
trading labor and goods for money which will purchase other
labor and goods.
The great contribution to theory made by Smith was in his
9. Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 11 et seq. (1949). Stocking
and Watkins, Cartels or Competition 7 (1948).
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model of the functioning of this system of exchange. The most
widely held view prior to publication of the Wealth of Nations
was that prices should be established by government, or by the semi-
governmental mercantile guilds, at a "just" level, and that it was
improper and probably illegal to sell or buy at any other price.
Smith argued that prices should be determined solely by the force
of competition in a free market. This, he said, would tend to achieve
the balance of production and consumption and the best distribu-
tion and division of labor. The natural price of any product is that
amount which is just sufficient to pay the rent of the land, the
wages of the labor and the profit of the capital employed in pro-
ducing it. The market price may be either above or below this
natural price, but it always gravitates toward or tends to approxi-
mate the natural price. The market price is regulated by the rela-
tion of supply and demand. If more is offered in the market at a
certain price than is demanded by those willing to pay that price,
then in order to sell all of the supply it will be necessary to offer
some at a lower price in order to induce others to purchase. This
will result in lowering the price of the commodity in general since
competition among sellers will force them all to sell at approxi-
mately the same price. On the other hand, if the amount offered in
the market is less than the demand at the price prevailing at any
time, then competition among the buyers will drive some of them
to offer a higher price, and the price of the commodity in general
will rise. Smith was careful to point out that the important con-
sideration is not the unexpressed desires of consumers, but the eco-
nomically effective demand. That is, the desire for goods plus the
ability and willingness to buy them at a particular price is the deter-
minative force.
Over any substantial period of time these market forces will
operate to secure such distribution of labor and capital that supply
and demand will tend to be equal for most commodities. Scarcity
of a commodity will result in prices high enough to attract new
producers into the field. Surplus of a commodity will depress prices
so that some will be driven out of that field and into the production
of other commodities which are more desired.
Smith was well aware that many factors might operate to disturb
this natural balance of economic forces. Such interference with the
proper operation of the competitive market was in all cases unde-
sirable, and in the long run, could not prevail. He recognized the
influence of monopoly and condemned it in unqualified terms:
"The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest
[Vol. 37:505
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which can be got. The natural price, or the price of free com-
petition, on the contrary is the lowest which can be taken, not
upon every occasion indeed, but for any considerable time to-
gether. The one is upon every occasion the highest which can
be squeezed out of the buyer, or which, it is supposed they will
consent to give: The other is the lowest which the sellers can
commonly afford to take, and at the same time continue their
business.
"The exclusive privileges of corporations, statutes of appren-
ticeship, and all those laws which restrain, in particular employ-
ments, the competition to a smaller number than might other-
wise go into them, have the same tendency, though in a lesser
degree. They are a sort of enlarged monopolies, and may fre-
quently, for ages together and in whole classes of employment,
keep up the market price of particular commodities above the
natural price, and maintain both the wages of labour and the
profits of the stock [capital] employed about them somewhat
above their natural rate.10
"Monopoly, besides, is a great enemy to good management,
which can never be universally established but in consequence of
that free and universal competition which forces everybody to
have recourse to it for the sake of self-defense.""
Many of the concepts employed by Smith were relatively vague
and remained to be sharpened and clarified by his followers. To
some extent this was due to his assumption that his meanings were
clear and required no great elaboration. It is evident that the com-
petition envisioned by Smith was the striving of a substantial num-
ber of buyers or sellers for the same commodity in one market.
He thought of the competitive price as one that is anonymously
established in the sense that no single buyer or seller can sig-
nificantly control it by his own action. Monopoly, in contrast, was
the situation in which a single seller had complete or nearly com-
plete control of a market and thus was able effectively to influence
the price by his own action. Even the monopolist could not set
any price he chose to e-x-tort, but the limits on his actions were those
set by the ability and tolerance of the buyers, not by the natural
laws of competion. In absence of government assistance to maintain
a monopoly, the force of competition seemed bound to prevail and
to drive the market price of any commodity toward an approximation
of the natural price.
The views of Smith were elaborated, refined and applied in the
writings of dozens of economists in the century and a half follow-
ing the publication of the Wealth of Nations. Among the best




known and influential of Smith's followers were Jean Baptiste Say,
David Ricardo and Alfred Marshall. Say was the principal con-
tinental exponent of Smith's theories, publishing his exposition of
them in 1803. He promulgated what has been known as Say's Law
of Markets, which was the assertion that the act of producing
goods provided the requisite purchasing power for buying them,
thus maintaining an invariable equivalence between what was pro-
duced and the purchasing power necessary to secure consumption of
that production. Thus, according to Say's law, in the operation of
the economy the aggregate of the demand for all goods must always
equal the total supply.
Ricardo worked out the purest and most rigorous formulation of
Smith's system. His greatest work, The Principle of Political
Economy and Taxation, was published in 1817. Among other
things, he formulated what has been characterized as "the iron law
of wages," stating, "The natural price of labour is that price which
is necessary to enable the labourers, one with another, to subsist
and to perpetuate their. race, without either increase or diminu-
tion.' 1 2 Further, an increase in wages cannot raise the price of
commodities, but will simply lower profits. If the prices of com-
modities generally are raised, this will have no effect chang-
ing the value of the medium in which both prices and profits are
estimated.13
The theories of the classical school of economists stemming from
Adam Smith were given their most adequate and mature presenta-
tion in the writings of Alfred Marshall, whose Principles of Eco-
nomics was published in 1890. He is generally conceded to be the
most representative, and probably the leading economist of his era
(1842-1924). Marshall stated that competition would indeed pro-
duce those forms of business enterprise best adapted to their en-
vironment, although this did not necessarily mean those that were
most beneficial to their environment. He had no doubt, so he said,
than an economic order operated by virtuous men co-operating
actively with one another would be superior to the best forms of
competition, but doubted that such a co-operative idea could func-
tion in the present world.
Marshall's concept of free competition was considerably more
realistic than that of his theoretical predecessors. Competition did
not assume or require complete knowledge of the market by all
12. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation,
chap. III on Wages. A convenient condensation of this work may be found in
Masterworks of Economics (Doubleday 1946).
13. Id., chap. IV On Profits.
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competitors or perfect mobility of the factors of production. It re-
quired only the use of such information and faculties as might be
possessed by the average well informed man, and a reasonable
mobility of labor and capital. Marshall noted a number of factors
tending to restrict the freedom of markets including law, custom,
trade union regulations, inertia, sentiment, geographical extent or
isolation, the immobility of fixed capital and the time lag involved
in any substantial market change. He suggested that the rapid
increase in capital and the drive toward specialization tended to
encourage monopoly and constitute a threat to the freedom of eco-
nomic action. On the other hand, he saw an element of monopoly
in every competitive business and thought that the power of
monopolies was of "uncertain tenure" because of the factors of
present or latent competition, the development of new instruments
of competition, greater consumer information, more emphasis upon
trade morality, and government intervention in business affairs.
Throughout his work he emphasizes the continuing power of com-
petition as a regulator of economic activity. A freely competitive
market is one of his basic assumptions and he is confident that in
the end the power of competition will establish equilibrium between
the forces of production and consumption.
These were the dominant economic ideas of the nineteenth cen-
tury (and indeed, of at least the first quarter of the twentieth).
During most of the nineteenth century such theories seemed accu-
rately to mirror the economic life of the country and to work out
well enough in practice. The common law rules against combinations
in restraint of trade were adequate to deal with such intentional
conduct as posed an undue threat to free competition in the market
place.
Beginning about 1880 however, a new movement in American
business forced itself into the public consciousness. Starting with
the formation of Standard Oil in the petroleum industry, great
national combinations of previously competing businesses were
formed.1 4 These combinations were originally clothed in the form
of "voting trusts," hence they came to be known popularly as
"trusts," although the term has long since lost any technical sig-
nificance. The power, rapacity and ruthlessness of the trusts created
a popular demand for more effective laws to curb them, and in 1890
14. Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 16 et seq. (1949) ; Stocking
Stocking and Watkins, Cartels or Competition 14 (1948). Also see Stocking
and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise, chapter 2 on "The Changing
Structure of the American Economy" (1951).
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the Sherman Act, the first Federal antitrust law, was enacted. 15 In
1914 the Sherman Act was strengthened by passage of the Clayton
Act, 8 and the Federal Trade Commission Act 7 set up the FTC
to assist in enforcement of the antitrust policy. Since then there have
been a number of amendments and additions to the antitrust laws,
but no fundamental changes have been made.' 8
Senator Sherman, in urging support of the proposal to enact an
antitrust law, clearly invoked the theories of the classical economists.
"This bill," he said, "does not seek to cripple combinations of capital
and labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but only
to prevent and control combinations made with a view to prevent
competition, or for the restraint of trade, or to increase the profits
of the producer at the cost of the consumer."'1 The Clayton Act
itself was even more explicit. It prohibited particular practices only
if they tended to lessen competition or create a monopoly. The pur-
pose of the antitrust laws was obviously the protection of competi-
tion and the maintenance of a competitive economy. The theory
of the antitrust laws was clearly the theory of the classical economists.
THE DISCREPANT CRITICISMS OF ANTITRUST
The antitrust laws have been the object of criticism almost since
the day of first enactment. During the years the overwhelming
weight of the criticism has been that the laws were too feeble and in-
effective. The 1914 passage of the Clayton and FTC acts was in re-
sponse to an insistent demand for strengthening the Sherman Act.
In recent years a new note has been struck: the antitrust laws
are attacked on the one hand because they have not been effective
in preventing the growth of big business and on the other hand,
because they are an undue hindrance to the development of big
business! The two schools presently engaged in attacking the anti-
trust laws are irreconciliable in both their assumptions and their
conclusions. The anti-big group points to the growth of giant
business concerns and the increase in the concentration of economic
power since the passage of the antitrust laws as evidence of their
ineffectiveness, takes this as proof of the decline in the effectiveness
of competition and infers that economic collectivism is thus in-
creasing and that socialism or nationalism in some form is the
inevitable result. The pro-big group points to our increasing ma-
15. 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 1 et seq.
16. 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 12 et seq.
17. 15 U. S. C. A. §§ 41 et seq.
18. See Congress and the Monopoly Problem: Fifty Years of Antitrust
Development 1900-1950, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., House Document No. 599
(1950).
19. Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 19 (1949).
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terial wealth and prosperity, correlates this with the growth of big
business, takes this as proof that our welfare depends upon the
development of big business, notes the antipathy of antitrust advo-
cates to big business and then, either directly or indirectly, suggests
that the rigor of the antitrust laws should be relaxed in order to
encourage the development of big business. (I know that "pro-" and
'anti-big" are poor terms to describe these viewpoints, but it is
convenient to have some names and these are the best I can think of.)
The problem was not formulated nor the issue joined between
these viewpoints until the 1930's, for the facts were either unknown
or unrecognized prior to then. The first clear statement of the situa-
tion was in 1932 with the publication of the now famous study by
Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Based upon careful research and analysis by an economist and a
lawyer, this study drew attention to the astonishing degree of control
which a relatively few corporate enterprises had secured in the
economy of the country. The two hundred largest non-banking
corporations were said to control approximately one-half of the
corporate wealth in the United States.20 The authors stated:
"Corporations have ceased to be merely legal devices through
which the private business transactions of individuals may be
carried on. Though still much used for this purpose, the cor-
porate form has acquired a larger significance. The corporation
has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a
means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremendous pro-
portions, there may be said to have evolved a 'corporate system'
-as there was once a feudal system-which has attracted to
itself a combination of attributes and powers, and has attained a
degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major
social institution."2' 1
"The corporate system has done more than evolve a norm
by which business is carried on. Within it there exists a centri-
petal attraction which draws wealth together into aggregations
of constantly increasing size, at the same time throwing control
into the hands of fewer and fewer men. The trend is apparent;
and no limit is as yet in sight. Were it possible to say that cir-
cumstances had established the coh'centration, but that there was
no basis to form an opinion as to whether the process would con-
tinue, the whole problem might be simplified. But this is not the
case. So far as can be seen, every element which favored concen-
tration still exists, and the only apparent factor which may end
the tendency is the limit in the ability of a few human beings
effectively to handle the aggregate of property brought under
their control.1
22
20. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 19
et seq. (1932).
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id. at IS.
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Such conclusions, well buttressed by supporting data, led Thur-
man Arnold, then a law school professor and later one of the most
effective of "trust-busters," to declare that the antitrust laws were
merely ceremonial parts of our folklore which, so far from hindering
the formation of monopolies, actually created an environment in
which concentrations of economic power could flourish. In 1937
Arnold wrote:
"The actual result of the antitrust laws was to promote the
growth of great industrial organizations by deflecting the attack
on them into purely moral and ceremonial dhannels. The process
was something like this: since the corporation was a person,
mere bigness could not make it a bad person. One cannot con-
demn his neighbor simply because he is big and strong. There-
fore, the courts soon discovered that it was only 'unreasonable'
combinations which were bad, just as any court would decide
that a big, strong neighbor should not be incarcerated so long
as he acted reasonably. In various other ways the actual enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws was completely emasculated by the
courts, not because the courts were composed of wicked and
hypocritical people, anxious to evade the law, but because such a
process is inevitable when an ideal meets in head-on collision
with a practical need. The process is just as unconscious as was
the toleration of speak-easies in dry communities during prohi-
bition. In this way the antitrust laws became the greatest protec-
tion to uncontrolled business dictatorships. '23
Shortly after writing this Mr. Arnold became the Assistant
Attorney General in charge of antitrust enforcement. Whether for
this reason or by coincidence, President Franklin D. Roosevelt on
April 29, 1938, sent a message to Congress calling attention to the
growing concentration of economic power and the decline of com-
petition.24 The President said that the choice was between the
diffusion of economic power and its transfer to government; big-
business collectivism compels an ultimate collectivism in govern-
ment. The existing antitrust laws were called inadequate, but the
President said it was not proposed to abandon but to strengthen
them. He called for a "thorough study of the concentration of eco-
nomic power in American industry and the effect of that concentra-
tion upon the decline of competition."
In response to this request, Congress created a Temporary
National Economic Committee composed of congressmen, senators
and representatives of numerous executive departments and ad-
23. Thurman Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 212-214 (1937).
24. Sen. Doc. 173, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. Final Report and Recommenda-
tions of the Temporary National Economic Committee, Sen. Doc. No. .-.
77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) p. 11, et seq.
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ministrative agencies.25 Some two years and nine months, 552
witnesses and eighty volumes later the TNEC rendered its final
report .2-1 Undoubtedly this represented the composite views of a
larger and more various group of eminent and distinguished men
than any other single expression on this subject. In general, the
report declared the country's faith in a competitive economic system
on the classical model, noted the gradual attrition of competition
that had taken place and recommended specific legislative measures
principally designed to strengthen the antitrust laws, as methods
of securing the continuance of our economic and political system.
The committee reported:
"It is generally agreed . . .that competition must be main-
tained as the principle of our economy, for everyone seems to
acknowledge that the alternative to competition is some of con-
centrated government authority which might easily destroy
democracy....
"The American ideal of living has not changed, but the
forms of our economic life have changed and most radically. The
new forms of industrial organization are such that competion
has become a vastly more difficult status to maintain, and the
American ideal of free living for people is not nearly so easy of
achievement as before organizations superseded men in the
economy....
"The American system is based on the maintenance of a
free market wherein the products of farm and factory are offered
for sale in competition which insures the movement of the great-
est quantity of goods at the lowest possible price. Many re-
straints on the free market have developed which impair the
functioning of the economy and burden consumers with unwar-
ranted charges. Consequently, the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee recommends the removal of these hindrances
as well as the adoption of measures which will increase the com-
petitive activity of the market place....
"It is important that it be made clear at this point that the
recommendations hereinafter made are all premised on the
proposition that the public policy evidenced by the Sherman Act
and by the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts holds
as good today as it did when this legislation was enacted. All
of this committee's recommendations are in furtherance of that
public policy, and in this connection it is significant that in all
the hearings held before this committee no witness so much as
suggested any substantive change in the basic philosophy of
those laws....
"It will avail us nothing to carry a gigantic defense program
25. An excellent account and summary of the formation, investigations
and data gathered by the TNEC may be found in David Lynch, The Con-
centration of Economic Power (1946).
26. Lynch, op. cit. mipra note 25 at 70.
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to a successful conclusion if in so doing we lose sight of the
basic philosophy of our American economy-a competitive sys-
tem of private capitalism....
"The extended study of the concentration of economic power
made by this committee leads inevitably to recommendations to
strengthen the enforcement of the antitrust laws. No hope of
preventing the increase of evils directly attributable to monopoly
is possible, no prospect of enforcing and maintaining a free
economic system under democratic auspices is in view, unless
our efforts are redoubled to cope with the gigantic aggregations
of capital which have become so dominant in our economic life." 27
Shortly after this report was issued the United States became
involved in World War II, and even such pressing matters as the
structure of our internal economy were forgotten in the heat of the
immediate struggle for survival. However, the problem of the dis-
tribution of economic power was in no way diminished by the
war. Some committee or subcommittee of Congress has been con-
cerned with the matter in each post-war session. No investigation
approaching that of the TNEC in scope has been undertaken,
though in 1947 a study was made by a staff under Congressman
(now Senator) Kefauver of the effectiveness of government efforts
to combat economic concentration.28 Mr. Kefauver himself reported:
"The record shows an alarming picture of the inadequacy of
present methods in combating further increases in concentration.
Concentration of economic power is a constantly moving, power-
ful force which can only be fought by an aggressive and con-
sistent Federal legislative program, followed up by a steadily
continuing active enforcement of antitrust laws by the executive
agencies." 29
The staff took a similar view:
"Previous investigations have reported that from 1900 to the
the present time our 'free enterprise economy' has been slipping
away from us through steadily increasing concentration of eco-
nomic power. It is surely obvious that as an increasing per-
centage of the Nation's business becomes controlled by a rela-
tively few large companies, this trend, if allowed to continue,
can only result in the Government regulating our economic
life....
"Inasmuch as concentration has increased steadily for the
last 50 years, the imprint of failure is present everywhere....
27. Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National
Economic Committee, Sen. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) pps.
25, 32-33, 35.
28. United States Versus Economic Concentration, Staff Report to
the Monopoly Subcommittee of the Committee on Small Business of the
House of Representatives, 79th Cong. (1947).
29. Id. at ix.
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Until recently the enforcement of the Sherman Act was largely
a matter of a policeman looking the other way....
"Each year that economic concentration increases makes a
maintenance of the competitive-enterprise economy increasingly
difficult. The stronger monopolistic forces become, the more in-
sistent are the arguments that really effective antitrust action
will dislocate business.
"Either we must believe in, and take the steps necessary to
make possible, a competitive-enterprise system, or we must
give it up, bit by bit, year by year.Y
30
Over the years a number of popular writers, many of them
drawing from these official sources, have expressed similar views. A
few competent economists have sought to make technical and de-
tailed analyses of the problems. Most discussion of the subject has
proceeded from the facts disclosed by these investigations to gen-
eralities regarding the failure of the antitrust laws in the past
and fervid declarations of the necessity for their resuscitation and
vigorous enforcement in the future. A study of "Monopoly and
Social Control" published in 1952 may be taken as characteristic.3"
Vith little explicit consideration of economic theory, the doctrines
of classical economics are obviously taken as fundamental assump-
tions. The control of monopoly is stated to be our major social
problem, and our failure in this endeavour is the root of our major
social ills. Monopoly has come upon us in the form of big business
and our hope for the future depends upon our willingness and
ability to cut it down to manageable size. In the author's words:
"The problem of monopoly is almost as old as organized
society. It appears throughout man's history in various forms,
depending upon the determining factors of a given economic
stage. In a feudal economy it assumes the form of control of
land by feudal lords; in the present day industrial countries it
manifests itself as private control of channels of trade, the
means of industrial production, and financial facilities.
'32
"That we have allowed monopoly to reach its present pro-
portions means that we were thwarted in the past in our aspira-
tions to control our social environment.
')3
"The advantages of mass production were nullified by the use
30. Id. at 1, 3,4, 11.
31. Henry A. Wells, Mfonopoly and Social Control (1952). Wendell
Berge, former Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice, and a well qualified author and critic in the
field, says in an Introduction that this book is "the most illuminating docu-
ment written in our time", and "the most penetrating analysis of the eco-
nomics of competition which I have read." These statements are obvious hy-
perbole. Mr. Berge's comments may be taken to indicate that the book is a
competent statement of a viewpoint with which Mr. Berge agrees.
32. Wells, op. cit. mipra note 31 at 1.
33. Id. at 7.
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of power inherent in the concentrated private control of eco-
nomic resources to subordinate public welfare to considerations
of private interest."3
... the courts arrived at the formulation of the monopoly
problem in terms of size at a time when the concentration of
economic power had attained such a magnitude that the task of
of enforcing the Sherman Act loomed already as a formidable
problem. While the process of the concentration of economic
power had been taking place all these years, the legal, judicial
and to a large extent the economic thinking had been unim-
pressed by the popular concept of the relation between size and
economic abuses.... Whatever the personal views and doubts
of the politicians, the danger in size-big business-was under-
stood by the rank and file."35
• .. an economic crisis is the consequence of the action of
monopolistic forces whose responsibility in the curtailment of op-
portunities for capacity production and full employment is seldom,
if at all, realized by the majority of the people ...the ever-
increasing progress of the monopolization of economic resources
(is) revealed in chronic unemployment in times of peace..."36
"Antitrust legislation embodies the thought of a logical and
reasoning effort to prevent monopoly from dominating our
economic structure. The fact that monopoly has attained the pro-
portions of major significance in our economy means that, as in
the court room so in our economic life, logic and reason tend to
be beyond the reach of social action.''87
"Antitrust legislation and adequate enforcement appear as
the media which can counteract the pressure of fatalistic eco-
nomic forces in the only possible way consistent with the Ameri-
can tradition and the American outlook on life." 38
In the face of these unqualified denunciations of monopoly it
would be natural to expect that there should be some among the
objects of such obloquy who would rise in their own defense. How-
ever, as the TNEC reported, among the hundreds of witnesses
from big business who testified before it not a single one suggested
that the basic philosophy of the anti-trust laws was faulty or should
be changed. All of them denied that their business was, or ap-
proached being, monopolistic; but big business, like its critics, ac-
cepted the classical theories of the competitive economy and ad-
mitted the evils of monopoly without question or challenge.
Within the last decade however, big business has found a few
spokesmen who were willing to throw down the gauntlet before
those who spoke of the "curse of bigness." In 1945, James Truslow
34. Id. at 116.
35. Id. at 122.
36. Id. at 123.
37. Id. at 147.
38. Id. at 156.
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Adams, a man of real literary ability although no obvious qualifica-
tions as an economist, undertook to examine the place of "Big
Business in a Democracy." He begins by a few animadversions on
how far modern man has come from the savage state. Next he re-
minds his readers of the benefits and advantages of living in Ameri-
ca. He does not attribute the superior position of the modern
American over the caveman entirely to big business, but he does
suggest that it is at least due to "business." Thus he says:
"But I think the biggest thing business or the hope of gain ever
did for the commonalty of the entire human race was the quest
of Columbus, by a new route, for the treasures of the Far East."3 9
Finally Mr. Adams undertakes a detailed examination of General
Motors as a prototype of big business, and finds that it is efficient,
progressive, democratic and benevolent. It is not, however, monopol-
istic; and the demonstration that General Motors possesses the
virtues attributed to it depends upon the premise that it operates
in a competitive situation. Mr. Adams indicates some views con-
cerning monopoly and competition in such discussions as this:
"It may be noted also that in a competing democratic market
a company cannot become big and remain so merely by deciding
to do this. Its size will, apart from other factors of management,
and so on, be determined, infallibly and primarily, by the num-
ber of satisfied customers in the market for its products."40
"The second [totalitarian] system, that of stifling competi-
tion by one big business or group, used to be tried under former
conditions and under the old ideas of what 'Big Business' meant.
It seems to me to be becoming more and more impossible, and
I say that with full realization of all the hullabaloo about cartels
and other forms of control, and with some knowledge of busi-
ness." '
1
"In my opinion, if you do not have competition the result
is stagnation. If somebody is perfectly sure of controlling a mar-
ket he is not going to work very hard to vary or improve his
product, and I do not think it makes any difference whether 'he'
is a government bureaucrat or an old-fashioned private-business
autocrat. Now the soul of competition in these days of science
and vastly expanded range of possible goods and methods is
research, ....Competition helps to build up research, and the
results of research help to stimulate competition."' 2
"'We have spoken of the value of competition, and we believe
in it, but there is a competition of the dog-eat-dog, or even of
the wolf-eat-wolf type, and there is a sane competition, with
39. James Truslow Adams, Big Business in a Democracy 40 (1945).
40. Id. at 194.
41. Id. at 195.
42. Id. at 202-203.
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value to the public in the back of its head, which may result
in a friendly and nationally wholesome co-operation. That is
what has been happening in American Big Business. '43
The "co-operation" referred to here appears to be the exchange
and sharing of personnel, material and production ideas that oc-
curred as part of the war effort. It is not quite clear whether Mr.
Adams regards this as appropriate to peacetime "competition"
or not.
A year later, Peter Drucker, an author of less literary distinction
but considerably more economic learning than Mr. Adams, similarly
undertook to examine the position of the large corporation in
modern society, also using General Motors as the prime example. 4"
Mr. Drucker agrees with the classical economists that social ad-
vantage is served by competition and subverted by monopoly:
"It should therefore be asserted uncompromisingly that a
monopolistic enterprise or a monopolistic industry always im-
pairs social stability and economic efficiency. This effect of
monopoly is inherent in its nature-simply because absolute
power always means abuse of power. The 'enlightened monopoly'
is a myth .... 45
However, Mr. Drucker argues that the theory of monopoly pric-
ing of the classical school is quite wrong under modem conditions.
The classical theory is based upon the assumption that supply is limit-
ed while demand depends upon the price and therefore is, in effect,
unlimited. On these assumptions, it becomes most profitable to sell
at a price which is higher than the "natural price" and at a level
where demand will take so much of the supply as to return the
greatest profit. There is, accordingly, an economic incentive to
monopoly. "But under modern industrial conditions, it is not supply
that is limited, but demand; supply in modern mass-production
industry has, by definition, no practical limitations."-," It follows
that the maximum profit is to be obtained by maximum production
at the minimum cost. In other words, even with a monopoly of the
market, a modem mass production business can obtain its maximum
profit by producing enough to satisfy the market demand entirely
and by doing so in the most efficient manner and at the lowest cost.
Nevertheless competition still has a function to serve:
"Under modem mass-production conditions maximum
profitability depends on maximum efficiency. In a monopolistic
business, competitive market standing is eliminated as a measure
43. Id. at 254.
44. Peter F. Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (1946).
45. Id. at 216.
46. Id. at 219.
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of efficiency; and we have seen in the preceeding chapter that
without the yardstick of the market, the objective checks of
efficiency function very poorly, if they function at all. In other
words, under modern mass-production conditions, a business
will realize the highest rate of profit on its invested capital only
if it is subject to that check of the competitive market which
a monopolistic business eliminates.
'4 7
Mr. Drucker concludes that one of the "five pillars on which
an economic policy for a free-enterprise society rests" must be
government regulation which is in the interest of free enterprise
itself-that is, in the prevention of monopoly.4 s He warns of the
necessity in such action of differentiating between monopoly, which
is always antisocial, and bigness, which can be made into a social
asset through decentralization; and between monopolistic practices
and attempts on the part of business to promote social stability
through long term price, sales and employment policies.
Up to 1952 the arguments of the pro-big school were chiefly
in the nature of "character references" for big business. The virtues,
including efficiency and benevolence, of big business were lauded,
the necessity of maintaining a competitive economy was duly noted,
and it was suggested that bigness was not only efficient and virtuous
but essentially irrelevant to the problem of monopoly.
In 1952 the public was treated to the surprising spectacle of a
new David appearing to champion Goliath. For the first time the
suggestion was made explicit that the antitrust laws were an undue
hindrance to big business, and that some change in the antitrust
policy should be made in order to favor the development of big busi-
ness. This most forthright defense of big business and attack upon
antitrust was made by David Lilienthal, first in a series of articles in
Collier's, and later in somewhat expanded form in a book on Big
Business: A New Era. Mr. Lilienthal is almost lyrical in his praise
of big business:
"My conviction about Big Business, as expressed through-
out this book, is that it represents a proud and fruitful achieve-
ment of the American people as a whole; that in Big Business
we have more than an efficient way to produce and distribute
basic commodities, and to strengthen the nation's security; we
have a social institution that promotes human freedom and
individualism."4 9
"This technique of production-and with it the equally im-
portant art of an ethical distribution of production-is a creative
thing, a combination of poetry and sweat. It calls for imagination,
47. Id. at 220.
48. Id. at 288.
49. David E. Lilienthal, Big Business: A New Era ix (1953).
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vitality, faith, as well as the skills of science, management, hu-
man relations and modern government techniques. This unfold-
ing of American productive and social genius is the most
exciting spectacle in the history of modern times."50
In this view, American productive and distributive superiority
over the rest of the world rests upon bigness in business, which is
"our greatest single functional asset."51 The force of this assertion
(it can hardly be called an argument) is somewhat weakened, if not
wholly dissipated, by the confession, late in the book, that the author
is using bigness "as a more or less convertible term for our indus-
trial and technical civilization.
'52
Mr. Lilienthal implicitly recognizes that competition is desirable
in arguing at some length that big business has engendered a New
Competition which expresses itself in research, diversification, inte-
gration, internal rivalry and advertising.53 One of the criteria for
measuring the beneficial effects of bigness is its success in stimulat-
ing competition between ideas, products or services.54 Conceding
that conspiracies to fix prices, limit production or dominate the mar-
ket are theoretically undesirable and illegal, it seems that in view
of the New Competition any effect on consumers "would be largely
irrelevant,"55 and success in such an attempt would be extremely
difficult if not impossible.58 Mr. Lilienthal cries for realism, common
sense and a dropping of old prejudices and assumes that his view-
point represents the result of such intellectual virtues."7 Speaking
from this realistic, unprejudiced and sensible viewpoint, Mr. Lilien-
thral warns us against thinking that there is a relation between big-
ness and monopoly."
From these premises Mr. Lilienthal draws the inferences that
our antitrust policy is fruitless and barren," unsuited to our present
needs, 0 and probably foredoomed to failure."' On this he states
his position plainly:
"This nation is confused, for we say one thing about size in
business and we do another and almost the opposite thing. We
distrust and inhibit and even threaten with criminal proceedings
the very economic talent which is one of our sources of strength
50. Id. at 31-32.
51. Id. at 33.
52. Id. at 191.
53. Id. at 58, 68, 73, 81, 88, 91, 93.
54. Id. at 11-12.
55. Id. at 62.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id. at xii, 3-4, 33, 159.
58. Id. at 41, 147.
59. Id. at 5.
60. Id. at 42, 77.
61. Id. at 116-117.
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and freedom, our capacity for large-scale undertakings. Our basic
economic law, the Sherman Antitrust Act, as it is more re-
cently construed, symbolizes our distrust, giving concrete ex-
pression to a temperamental aversion to Bigness and to our
belief in competition."'"
2
"But no discussion of Bigness can ignore the antitrust laws.
For the essential fact is that as these laws are now construed, the




There is, however, a curious ambivalence in Mr. Lilienthal's
enthusiasm. Although he apotheosizes and capitalizes "Bigness,"
he concedes that there is such a thing as a "moderate and sensible
Bigness," that the anti-big strictures have some basis "in the case
of some very large enterprises," and that:
"Many (though not all) of the advantages of Big Business
can probably be equally well achieved without going to extremes
of size; greater efficiency, liveliness and speed of action are
attainable where Bigness is not extreme.
'6 4
However, since General Motors and DuPont are among his
exhibits as to the virtues of bigness, the reservations regarding
"extremes of size" do little except add obscurity to some fairly
fuzzy ideas.
Additional confusion is introduced into the discussion by Mr.
Lilienthal's reliance on the' government to control big business by
some means other than the antitrust laws, in ways which he fails to
specify. He says:
"It is government's changed and expanded role in economic
affairs, notably since 1933, that in my opinion reduces to quite
manageable proportions the abuses by Big Business: thus armed
we can now safely promote and encourage Bigness rather than
view its growth with apprehension."63
"Today the degree of actual control and 'absolutism' that re-
mains in the hands of the directors and officers of the largest
American corporations has changed almost beyond recogni-
tion."6 1
"To put it another way, the change in public accountability
on the part of industrial management is a reflection of the effec-
tiveness of the new checks and balances upon abuses of economic
power. It raises sharply the question of hpw substantial and how
relevant today are the traditional and historical fears of Big
Business. ' '67
The burden of the argument is that trust-busting does not make
62. Id. at 37-38.
63. Id. at 167.
64. Id. at 158.
65. Id. at x-xi.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Id. at 30-31.
1953]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
sense today and that we should adopt a new approach. 8 The closest
we come to a specification of the new approach is this:
"The Sherman Act forbids "restraint of trade'-a double
negative. The new law, by contrast, should expressly foster the
'development of trade'-a double affirmative. It is my sugges-
tion that we should not attempt a whole array of specific amend-
ments to this and that section of the Sherman Act or the Clayton
Act, but rather a broad declaration of public policy that the
prime concern of Congress is not with competition, per se, nor
with competitors, but with productivity and the promotion of an
ethical and economic distribution of this productivity." 61
Considering the eminence of its author and the prominence of its
publication, Mr. Lilienthal's book exhibits unbelievable confusion of
thought. It manifests an almost total ignorance of legal tradition,
of judicial interpretation of the subject, and of the literature in this
field. Phrases and ideas are suggested as novel which have been
current in the literature for decades. 70 Mr. Lilienthal says it is
dubious whether there has been an increase in the concentration of
economic power in recent years, and cites aluminum, steel and oil
as industries in which the dominance of a single concern has mark-
edly declined.71 He fails to note that these are industries in which
there has been notable antitrust activity, and that in at least two and
perhaps all three cases, the diffusion of economic power that has
occurred appears to be due primarily to antitrust enforcement. Al-
though antitrust is preeminently a field in which the law is made
by the United States Supreme Court, and although the whole
burden of this book has to do with the putative present interpreta-
tion of the antitrust laws, there is no discussion or consideration of
Supreme Court opinions. For legal authority one Supreme Court
opinion is indirectly cited in a footnote,7 2 one dissenting opinion
is referred to twice7, and one circuit court opinion is cited twice.74
Most important, the fundamental concepts employed in the book
are undefined, confused and inaccurate. For example, in the course
of the argument that bigness tends toward efficiency and is desirable
it is said that it serves to conserve our natural resources. Mr. Lilien-
68. Id. at 167, et seq.
69. Id. at 185.
70. Lilienthal informs us, at pages 25-26 and elsewhere, that as the
result of changes in the last 20 years there has developed a "New Competi-
tion." Actually this phrase, with substantially the same connotation, has
been in use for more than four decades. See American Column & Lumber Co.
v. United States 257 U.S. 377, 392 (1921) ; Stocking and Watkins, Cartels or
Competition 16 (1948) ; Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enter-
prise 130 (1951).
71. Lilienthal, op. cit. supra note 70 at 25-26, 139-140.
72. Id. at 175.
73. Id. at 4,173.
74. Id. at 50, 175.
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thal reports that the 1950 census shows that the size of the average
farm has increased to 215.3 acres, which is an increase of 42%
over 1920, and observes:
"These large-sized farms-with a marked decrease in farms
operated by tenants and share-croppers-are doing about the
most intelligent job of land conservation ever achieved in
America.... In my opinion, size has contributed in a salutary
way in this progress of farm conservation and output. '75
To use such an illustration in the course of a discussion of big
business is obvious nonsense. Any concept of bigness which is
equally applicable to General iVotors and an Iowa farm of 215 acres
must, of necessity, be so vague as to be meaningless.
The suggestion that government encourage the development of
trade rather than forbid its restraint is equally naive, meaningless
and untenable. The whole tradition of political and economic free-
dona which has been developed over the course of centuries by our
legal system postulates that anti-social conduct shall be forbidden,
but that within the broad limits of such prohibitions each individual
shall be free to seek his welfare and happiness as he pleases. To take
the view that instead of forbidding what may not be done govern-
ment shall prescribe what shall be done, would require that govern-
ment assume a role of authoritarian paternalism which would be not
only revolutionary but obviously intolerable to the American people.
The most charitable understatement that can be made is that it
would be most impractical for the courts to undertake to prescribe
the methods and practices that might "develop" trade, rather than
to strike down restraint and monopolies when they are discovered.76
The latest entry in the lists of this debate takes a position dia-
metrically opposed to that of Lilienthal on nearly every point. The
author, T. K. Quinn, as a former vice-president of General Electric
has somewhat more obvious qualifications than Mr. Lilienthal to
speak on the subject. He relates his experiences of twenty-four
years as an insider in big business in an anecdotal and slightly
gossipy manner. However, where Mr. Lilienthal indulges in un-
supported generalizations and abstract opinions, Mr. Quinn gives
names, dates, places and events in profusion in support of his
conclusions. Yet he does not hesitate to generalize as broadly
as any:
"The grand proposition that a thing is not evil simply be-
cause it is big is being advanced by self-serving interests as
75. Id. at 123.
76. Compare discussion in Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 185
et seq. (1949), and the cases cited, especially Schechter v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 551 (1935).
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though they were dealing with harmless, static business giants,
when in fact 'there ain't no such animal.' "7
"Historically, political freedom has never long outlived eco-
nomic freedom, and our economic freedom is not being main-
tained. Posed against us are not only the old-world ideas of
political collectivism, but also a rapidly developing internal eco-
nomic collectivism which subordinates millions of Americans in
monster-big corporations ruled by nonelected, self-perpetuating
officers and directors exercising powerful influence-where it is
not actual control-over the economy.
'7 8
"Precisely as we cage tigers and elephants but allow cats
and dogs to run loose, so must we come of economic age to the
extent at least of recognizing that enormous size in artificial,
self-interested, impersonal corporations is a threat to all of our
freedoms and to the peace of the world. '7 9
Mr. Quinn believes in the value and necessity of competition in
the classic sense including price competition." But competition is
being destroyed by the growth of giant business enterprises, by
mergers, and by "co-operation," gentlemen's agreements, price
leadership, and mutual self-restraint."' The growth of the business
giants is not, as the pro-big apologists would have us believe, due
to superior efficiency or competitive success. Rather it is the result
of the tremendous advantages of large amounts of capital and of
the ability to engage in extensive and expensive advertising. 2
Manufacturing and operating costs of the smaller companies are
actually less than those of the giants.8 3 Even in the field of research,
usually cited as the special domain of big business, Mr. Quinn says
that the greatest contribution comes from small business:
"For important inventions and progress we must look mainly
to the many little people and not to the well publicized, huge
research organizations. Most inventions are accidents and the
number of such inventions is likely to be proportionate to the
number of people involved and interested .... Original inven-
tions are no more plentiful, proportionately, in big than in
small organizations. '8 4
"I know of no original product invention, not even electric
shavers or heating pads, made by any of the giant laboratories
or corporations, with the possible exception of the household
garbage grinder, developed not by the research laboratory but
by the engineering department of General Electric. But the
basic idea of this machine came from a smaller concern produc-
77. Quinn, Giant Business: Threat to Democracy 5-6 (1953).
78. Id. at 10.
79. Id. at 204.
80. Id. at 284, 293.
81. Id. at 75, 133, 201, 231.
82. Id. at 79, 167, 171, 200, 227-228, 233, 311.
83. Id. at 167.
84. Id. at 113-114.
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ing commercial grinders. It was hardly an original invention.
The record of the giants is one of moving in, buying out and
absorbing the smaller creators."8' 5
The growth of giant corporations is establishing us as a nation
of employees, 8 6 and the leaders of industry are not those who have
come to the top through the possession of superior abilities, but
either those who are lucky in the possession of wealth or personal
friendships, or grinding bureaucrats who remain neutral and do
nothing to offend their superiors.17 Moreover, in large corporations
the executives are likely to be department specialists with knowledge
and outlook more limited than those of the smaller corporation
official who inclines to be a better-rounded man.88 In these circum-
stances, we are forced to conclude that the antitrust laws are not
strong enough:
"Unfortunately, both the Sherman and the Clayton laws
have been rendered largely ineffective and inoperative by court
interpretations and by clever lawyers in the service of the big
interests. The concentration of economic power into bigger and
bigger corporations has proceeded in leaps and bounds. Now
we have an economy on a gigantic scale, with a concentration
of power in relatively few hands, that is choking the life out of
our traditional economic freedom. The Department of Justice,
limited by inadequate funds, does what it can to enforce the law,
but what is needed to carry out the will of the people is a law
with some teeth in it, which Congress has not seen fit to pass."8 9
What difficulties of enforcement are indicated:
"In all these matters we forget that a court may devote a few
weeks or months and part of its time to a consideration of a busi-
ness or industry, but those engaged in it devote all of their time
and lives to it and are almost sure to find ways of doing what
they want to do, despite the intention and wording of the court
decisions, unless they are final, definite, clear and unequivo-
cal.",0
The difficulties, however, indicate the necessity of more, rather
than less, effort and activity in the enforcement of the antitrust
laws.9 '
Although Mr. Quinn speaks chiefly of business in terms of big
and small, he is not (like Mr. Lilienthal) speaking in terms of
vague abstractions. He sees power as "the central point and essence"
85. Id. at 117.
86. Id. at 34, 45-46, 49, 136.
87. Id. at 52, 106, 145. Note that Mr. Quinn is here referring only to the
executives of giant corporations and not to business leaders or executives
generally.
88. Id. at 146.
89. Id. at 40.
90. Id. at 71.
01. Id. at 224.
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of the controversy involving big and small business. 9 2 The struggle
for bigness is essentially a quest for power; and one of the worst
indictments against big business is that its officials, like all other
humans, are corrupted by too much power, come to identify their
own interests with those of society, and trample heedlessly on the
rights of others.9 3 Since big business in the sense in which Mr.
Quinn uses it represents essentially an aggregation of private power
over a large segment of the economy, rather than simply a business
enterprise organized for production, it inevitably leads to extensions
of government power, or big government.9 4 The trend toward aggre-
gations of power in big business and big government, in turn, leads
at its best to socialism, and at its worst "threatens to undermine the
foundation of free society and create a tyranny more ruthless than
any which mankind has ever known."95 All in all, Mr. Quinn is
more interested in reporting the facts as he has observed them and
warning of the dangers of present trends than in seeking to formu-
late programs or remedies. Nevertheless the lesson of his message
is unmistakable: strengthen and enforce the antitrust laws or both
economic and political freedom will perish and the American way
of life will vanish.
COMPETITION IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOmiC THEORY
The debate as to the significance and effect of the antitrust
policy has, as we have seen, been conducted almost exclusively in
terms of the classical economic theories. It has, of course, been duly
noted from time to time that actual conditions frequently deviated
from the textbook model, but this was not of great consequence
since the economists themselves had considered this fact. The
important point is that discussions of antitrust have nearly always
assumed that in general and in the long run the economy would
behave as Adam Smith, Ricardo and Marshall said it would. How-
ever, in the last twenty-five years a number of economic theorists
have drawn radically different theoretical inferences from the ob-
served facts than were drawn by the classical school. As a result,
the model of the economic system that is accepted by competent
economists today is notably different than the one propounded by
the classical school, although the latter still retains its popular
prestige.
The most fundamental and far-reaching of the revisions of
92. Id. at 213.
93. Id. at 298.
94. Id. at 188, 224, 292.
95. Id. at 141, 102, 130, 187.
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classical theory are due to the ideas of John Maynard Keynes. Al-
though Lord Keynes was an Englishman, his ideas had a profound
effect on thinking in the United States and much of our govern-
mental policy during the last twenty years is a reflection of his
theories.
Keynes himself said that his economic theory did not supersede
the classical theory, but merely generalized it.96 Thus he character-
ized his theory as a general theory which includes the classical theory
as a special case. The postulates of the classical theory are applicable
only to this special case, which is a limiting point in the variations
of economic forces as postulated by the general theory.
The principal problem to which Keynes addressed himself was
the instability of the economic system, its failure to provide for full
employment, and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth
and income. 7 He took as given conditions of the problem the exist-
ing social structure, including the available labor and capital, exist-
ing industrial techniques and the current degree of competition 5
Keynes observed that it is characteristic of the economic system that
while it is subject to severe fluctuations of production and em-
ployment, it is not violently unstable. Indeed, it seems capable of
remaining in a chronic condition of subnormal activity for sub-
stantial periods without any marked tendency either toward auto-
matic recovery or complete collapse. While fluctuations of the eco-
nomic cycle start briskly, they generally wear themselves out before
proceeding to extremes and the normal situation is an intermediate
one between a severe depression and great prosprity with full
employment." This is contrary to the predictions of the classical
theory which holds that in the absence of artificial restrictions on the
market, the economy will constantly tend toward a condition of
equilibrium at the point of optimum employment and production.
Keynes, therefore, seeks to analyze the factor which explains
this observed behaviour. His analyzis is involved and technical and
is probably perfectly comprehensible only to economists (which
does not include this writer). His broad conclusions are understand-
able, however, even by lawyers untrained in economics. In sum-
mary, he reaches the conclusion that the conditions which are capable
of explaining the observed results are the variations in production,
96. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment In-
terest and Money 3 (1936). This work is the definitive statement of Keynes'
theories. Although it was not published until 1936 many of the ideas it con-
tained had previously been stated by Keynes in speeches and papers.
97. Id. at 372.
98. Id. at 245.
99. Id. at 250.
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interest or employment in the economy generally are associated with
moderate, but not proportionate or compensatory, changes in con-
sumption, investment and wages.100 In essence Keynes says that
changes in prices, interest or wages are correlated with changes in
the supply of goods, money and labor, as stated in the classical
theory; but that the changes in prices, interest and wages are not
held by any economic law or force to such magnitude as automatical-
ly to compensate for the precise change that has occurred in the
supply of goods, money or labor. Thus, whereas the classical theory
reached the conclusion that the economy always tended toward
equilibrium at a point of maximum production and employment,
Keynes reaches the conclusion that the economy does not have
any inherent equilibrium, but may remain for an indefinite period
either at any point between full production and employment and
complete collapse or in oscillation around any such point.
One of the chief theoretical contributions of Keynes was the
intellectual repeal of Say's law. Keynes demonstrated that the act
of production does not always, or even often, provide the purchasing
power for consuming the goods produced. On the contrary, one of
the principal faults of the economic system is that variations in the
interest rate are not adequate in themselves to insure an optimum
rate of investment. It follows that the only means of insuring a
reasonable approximation to full production and employment is
by some "socialization" or government control of investment. 10 It is
accordingly justified for the government to influence the economy
through the manner and rate of taxation, control of the rate of
interest, by the expenditure of funds in public works and similar
means. However, aside from this measure of central control, state
ownership of the instruments of production is neither important
nor desirable. Thus Keynes indicated that his theories, although
unconventional, are moderately conservative in their implications:
"Our criticism of the accepted classical theory of economics
has consisted not so much in finding logical flaws in its analysis
as in pointing out that its tacit assumptions are seldom or never
satisfied, with the result that it cannot solve the economic prob-
lems of the actual world. But if our central controls succeed in
establishing an aggregate volume of output corresponding to
full employment as nearly as is practicable, the classical theory
comes into its own again from this point onwards .... Thus,
apart from the necessity of central controls to bring about an
adjustment between the propensity to consume and the induce-
100. Id. at 250-254.
101. Id. at 378.
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ment to invest, there is no more reason to socialize economic
life than there was before.
"To put the point concretely, I see no reason to suppose
that the existing system seriously misemploys the factors of
production which are in use .... It is in determining the volume,
not the direction, of actual employment that the existing system
has broken down."'1 2
Keynes fully believes in the traditional advantages of indi-
vidualism-efficiency, decentralization and the play of self-interest.
He says:
"The advantages to efficiency of the decentralization of deci-
sions and of individual responsibility is even greater, perhaps,
than the nineteenth century supposed; and the reaction against
the appeal to self-interest may have gone too far. But, above
all, individualism, if it can be purged of its defects and its
abuses, is the best safeguard of personal liberty in the sense
that, compared with any other system, it greatly widens the
field for the exercise of personal choice. It is also the best safe-
guard of the variety of life, which emerges precisely from this
extended field of personal choice, and the loss of which is the
greatest of all losses of the homogenous or totalitarian state. For
this variety preserves the traditions which embody the most
secure and successful choices of former generations; it colours
the present with the diversification of its fancy; and, being the
handmaid of experiment as well as of tradition and fancy, it is
the most powerful instrument to better the future."'10 3
Thus, while destroying the old notion that there is some im-
plicit force immanent in the economic structure which will auto-
matically bring about a state of maximum production and employ-
ment regardless of any transient fluctuations, Keynes supported
the position that with the addition of certain limited government
controls to accomplish specific objectives, an economy on the classi-
cal model is still the most efficient and most desirable. While there
are some tchnical deficiencies in the Keynesian theories which the
professional economists may debate for years,'04 the public (most
of whom have never heard his name) have long since become con-
vinced followers of Keynes' principal doctrines, largely on the basis
of their demonstrated utility in alleviating the effects of the depres-
sions between the wars.
Another important modification of classical theory was pro-
pounded at about the same time as the writings of Keynes in the
work of Professor Edward Chamberlin. His concern was with
the ideas of competition and monopoly and their supposed behaviour
102. Id. at 378-379.
103. Id. at 380.
104. See John M. Clark, Alternative to Serfdom 91 et seq. (1948).
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in determining market price. Chamberlin points out that monopoly
ordinarily means control over supply and therefore over price. Pure
competition means the absence of such control in any one, which
implies that there be a large number of buyers and sellers so that
the influence of any one is negligible, and that the goods be homo-
geneous and be sold in the identical market for all.1°i In the classical
analysis there is a separate theory for the pricing phenomena of a
market when it is either competitive or monopolistic, but none for a
market which is intermediate betveen the two.10 6 However, analysis
of actual markets reveals that these two elements are complexly in-
terwoven throughout the price system, with all markets showing
some characteristics of each.
Chamberlin seeks to use a rigorous definition of monopoly:
"The term 'monopoly' is meaningless without reference to
the thing monopolized. A monopoly of diamonds is not a
monopoly of precious stones, nor, to go still further, of jewelry.
Differentiation implies gradations, and it is compatible with
perfect monopoly of one product that control stop short of some
more general class of which this product is a part, and within
which there is competition."' 0 7
There is differentiation of any product in an economic sense if
any significant basis exists for distinguishing it from the product of
another seller. The basis may be real or fancied, important or unim-
portant, so long as it is sufficient to lead buyers to a preference for
one product over another. 0 8 Thus every seller of a product which is
in any way differentiated has, in some degree, a kind of monopoly.
The number of sellers in a field cannot be taken as a necessary indi-
cation of the degree of competition or monopoly, since the number in
the field depends, first of all, upon how broadly the field is defined. 0 9
These considerations make it clear that a pure monopoly is
reached only in the case of control of the supply of all economic
goods when the competition of substitutes is excluded by defini-
tion. Similarly, pure competition can be reached only where large
classes of goods are perfectly standardized and are offered at the
same time and place by a large groups of sellers to a large group
of buyers, so that every seller faces the competition of a number of
perfect substitutes for his product. Thus it can be seen that these
are unreal abstractions. Both pure monopoly and pure competition
are merely limiting conceptions which mark the ends of a continuum
105. Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 7 (1933; 6th
ed., 1948).
106. Id. at 3-5.
107. Id. at 65.
108. Id. at 56.
109. Id. at 197.
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upon which are represented all gradations between the two ex-
tremes. 10 Actual markets are always a mixture of the two elements
of monopoly and competition, necessarily lying some place on the
continuum between the two abstract limiting cases.'
From these elements Chamberlin constructs a theory of pricing
which is designed to fit the numerous situations arising from varia-
tions in the numbers of sellers and differentiation of the products.
In brief, the theory of monopolistic competition holds that prices will
tend to vary from the purely competitive price and to approximate
the monopoly price depending upon the the degree of control which
the dealers have in the market and their knowledge of the probable be-
haviour of other sellers in the same market. For example, if differ-
entiation of the product is slight, even though the seller has perfect
control over the particular product, his control over price will be
negligible or non-existent because of the competition of substitute
products in the same market." 2 But a seller who has, instead of a
monopoly of a brand, a monopoly of an entire class of products, has
much greater control over price. "The more substitutes controlled
by any one seller, the higher he can put his price.""13
In a market with a limited number of sellers, if the sellers com-
bine, obviously there is monopoly and control of the price.". 4 Like-
wise, if sellers in a market consciously act with regard to their
total (rather than individual) influence upon the price, the price
will be a monopoly one."x5 If the sellers in a market of few sellers
act independently, the price will depend upon the numbers,
assumptions and knowledge of the sellers. To the degree that the
sellers are numerous and act without knowledge of or regard for
the actions of the others, the price will approach the competitive
price; to the degree that the sellers are fewer in number and know
or correctly assume the actions of the other sellers and the aggregate
influence of the sellers on the market, the price will approach the
monopoly price. A similar analysis applies also to competitive fac-
tors other than price.""6
Chamberlin concludes that it is fallicious to identify free enter-
prise with perfect or pure competition:
"... the typical outcome of free enterprise is not pure com-
petition but monopolistic competition. Commodities are differ-
110. Id. at 8, 63.
111. Id. at 204.
112. Id. at 66.
113. Id. at 67.
114. Id. at 31.
115. Id. at 54.
116. Id. at 195-196.
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entiated partly by their very nature (without regard to demand),
and partly in response to differences in buyers' tastes, prefer-
ences, locations, etc., which are as much a part of the order of
things within any broad class of product as they are between
one class of product and another. Heterogeneity from these
causes is vastly increased by businessmen under 'free enterprise,'
in their efforts further to distinguish their commodity from
others and to manipulate the demand for it through advertising.
In other words, an essential part of free enterprise is the attempt
of every businessman to build up his own monopoly, extending
it wherever possible and defending it against the attempts of
others to extend theirs. There is no tendency for these monopo-
lies to be competed out of the picture; on the contrary, they
are as much a part of it as is the competition which restrains
them."1 7
Although not all of the implications or technical consequences
of this theory are universally accepted, the work of Chamberlin, as
of Keynes, has influenced economic thinking generally toward a
more realistic understanding of the forces actually at work in the
economic environment, particularly of the nature of competition.
The most recent contributor to original thinking in this field is,
like Chamberlin, a professor of economics at Harvard. Professor
John Galbraith also starts with the apparent inconsistencies between
the theoretical requirements and predictions of the classical system
and the actual functioning of American capitalism. The first re-
quirement of the classical system, as he points out, is competition,
which, if rigorous is a sufficient condition for successful operation
of the system. 118 The incentive to socially desirable behaviour on
the part of business is provided by its competitors. The classical
economist did not look beyond competition and thus they found
the self-regulatory mechanism of the economy exclusively in the
interaction of those on the same side of the market."9 At the same
time, the concept of competition used by the economists was refined
to the point where it became the definition of a model that would
produce ideal results, but which did not correspond to observable
reality. 20 Extensive and reliable investigations such as those of
Berle and Means and the TNEC have shown that a small num-
ber of large concerns are responsible for a substantial proportion of
all industrial activity. It is decidedly dubious whether or not this
concentration is increasing and the exact statistical measure of con-
centration is probably subject to a significant margin of error,
117. Id. at 213-214.
118. John K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Counter-
vailing Power 14 (1952).
119. Id. at 117.
120. Id. at 17.
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but there is no serious challenge to the general conclusion.' 5 '
Further, the typical industry is shared by a relatively small number
of corporations, so that there is concentration in individual markets
as well as in the aggregate.
Under these conditions the market of few sellers commonly
establishes a convention outlawing prices as a weapon of competi-
tive warfare.1 22 But a similar convention against innovation or
technical improvement would require a remarkably comprehensive
form of collusion, which would be both difficult as well as legally
dangerous. 23 Consequently, even under oligopoly, or a market domi-
nated by a few, there remains an attenuated but still workable com-
petition which minimizes the scope for exercise of private market
power and makest this structure preferable to any available alterna-
tive. -'2 4 Thus, while the market concentration of American industry
does not operate at any given moment to encourage the largest
possible production at the lowest possible price, it is favorable to
technical progress and has produced the showpiece of American
Industrial achievement.12
5
Galbraith believes that this analysis, while valid so far as it
goes, is inadequate, by itself, to explain the relatively satisfactory
performance of the economic system, and is incomplete. Economists
have failed to see that the long trend toward concentration of indus-
trial enterprise in the hands of relatively few firms has brought into
existence not only strong sellers but also strong buyers. Thus the
same process which impaired the restraints on private power on
one side of the market operated to create new restraints on such
power operating from the other side of the market. Galbraith calls
this counterpart of competition "countervailing power.' 26
The scope and effect of countervailing power is wider than might
be supposed at first impression. At the end of virtually every channel
by which consumers' goods reach the public there is in practice a
layer of powerful buyers.'12 7 So, most positions of market power in
the production of consumers' goods are covered by positions of
countervailing power.' 's The retailer is typically concerned with
his volume of sales, and so it is in his interest to resist any exercise
121. Id. at 4041.
122. Id. at 48.
123. Id. at 94.
124. Id. at 61.
125. Id. at 96, 99.
126. Id. at 118.
127. Id. at 126.
128. Id. at 128.
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of market power by suppliers that results in higher prices and to
exercise whatever power he can to reduce prices. 129
Countervailing power, as thus conceived, performs an indis-
pensable regulatory function in the modern economy, 13' and our
government policy should be as concerned with strengthening
countervailing power as with strengthening competition.' 3 ' On this
aspect, Galbraith says:
"Since the development of countervailing power is irregular
and incomplete, it does not provide a blanket case for the ex-
clusion of state interference with private decision. Moreover the
state must be expected to participate in the development of
countervailing power. Nonetheless, it is countervailing power
which, in the typical modern market, regulates the power of
private decision. As such it provides the negative justification
for leaving decision in private hands, for it prevents these deci-
sions from working harm on others."'1 2
This rationale has the incidental advantage of justifying the exclu-
sion of labor and agriculture from the general operation of the
antitrust laws, a point which has bothered many who believed in
the fundamental wisdom of antitrust policy.' 33
The theory of countervailing power implies certain extremely
important limitations upon its operation. First, it will operate as
an effective restraint on market power only when there is a relative
scarcity of demand. That is, the buyer must be of sufficient impor-
tance to the seller so that there is at least some degree of compul-
sion interest in complying with the buyer's demand.' 3 This is
roughly equivalent to saying that in a "seller's market" there is
little opportunity for the development or influence of countervail-
ing power on the part of buyers.
Second, and most important, countervailing power cannot oper-
ate at all in a market dominated by a single seller. For counter-
vailing power to be effective it is necessary that the buyers have
some alternatives. A few large buyers opposed in a market to a few
large sellers may play off one seller against the other, or at least
have an opportunity to shift their trade from one to the other if
there is anything less than a perfect coalition between the sellers.
Without this degree of flexibility in the market there is no oppor-
129. Id. at 124.
130. Id. at 143.
131. Id. at 155.
132. Id. at 173.
133. Id. at 145, 173. The writer of this article confesses that he was one
of those who had previously thought of the exemptions of labor and agricul-
ture from the antitrust laws as simply a recognition of political power.
Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 79 et seq. (1949). Galbraith's theory
is much more rational and satisfactory on this point.
134. Loevinger, op. cit. smpra note 133 at 136.
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tunity for the operation of countervailing power. Thus this theory
supports the classical theory in the conclusion that there is some-
thing uniquely evil about monopoly.135
A third limitation on the operation of countervailing power is
that it does not exist where industries are integrated vertically. In-
dustries which control their own distributing as well as manufac-
turing facilities, whether through ownership or influence over
dependent dealer organizations, are not faced with countervailing
power.' Finally, in an inflationary period of the economy counter-
vailing power loses its effectiveness. During inflation the demands
for increases in prices and wages become more insistent and the
incentives to resist such demands become less potent since any in-
creases can easily be passed on to the consumers. Consequently
countervailing power must not be supposed to exert an automatic
check upon inflationary movements but, on the contrary, may ac-
tually operate to reinforce them.137
With all of its limitations, this theory obviously broadens the
scope of economic doctrine to include important and heretofore un-
rationalized aspects of economic behaviour. Galbraith suggests that
there are important policy considerations which follow from this.
While there are good reasons for government action attacking posi-
tions of original market power in the economy, there is no justifica-
tion for attacking positions of countervailing power and leaving
positions of original market power untouched. This would ordinarily
be inequitable and damaging to the economy. 38 This does not mean
that an exemption of countervailing power should be written into the
antitrust laws.'3 5 It does indicate that before action is taken against
the possession and exercise of market power the question should be
asked: Against whom and for what purposes is the power being
exercised ?1-1 Further, the theory of countervailing power supports
the antitrust policy of seeking to prevent monopoly or quasi-
monopoly. Action to prevent or disperse single-firm control of an
industry is desirable since it provides an opening for the exercise
of countervailing power; and similar and equally good reasons exist
for resisting mergers.'
4 1
There is no neat formulation of contemporary economic theory
which ties all of these new ideas into a tidy theoretical package.
135. Id. at 151.
136. Id. at 129.
137. Id. at 196 et seq.
138. Id. at 144.
139. Id. at 151, 149.
140. Id. at 149.
141. Id. at 151.
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Galbraith's formulation is, in any event, too recent to have re-
ceived much attention from other economists. However, one of
the best of the eclectic economists is John M. Clark, who has sought
to give some thought to the place of competition in current economic
theory.
Clark contrasts competition with security because the drive for
security is the most ptwerful limiting force on competition and be-
cause competition and security represent polar conditions in the
business environment. 1 2 Monopoly, on the other hand, is attractive
to business as much because it represents security and ease as be-
cause it offers the opportunity for exorbitant profits. It is even
suggested that: "The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life."'14
Thus monopolies do not by any means tend always to seek the
highest price that can be gotten, but rather to fix prices at a level
which will give a satisfying profit and which is higher than eco-
nomically justified, and then to maintain them at that level.
Monopoly prices thus tend to be "sticky," or unresponsive to
changes in economic conditions. A monopoly, therefore, can do
plenty of harm even if it uses only a third or a quarter of its
monopoly power. 44
Clark believes that competition is still the main safeguard
against economic exploitation in our civilization.4 5 However, he
does not think that competition, in order to be workable, must
correspond to the models of the economists. On the contrary,
"business competition exhibits almost infinite variety."' 14 It may
involve price, quality, substitutes, services, or any and all of these.
It may involve short-term and long-term forces and trends. It may
exist in greater or less degree, and actual conditions range through
many degrees of competition and near monopoly. And:
"Finally, one neglected feature of competition is the fact
that, like most human matters, it is always evolving. Economists
are typically in error in this respect through their predisposition
to find fixed and unchanging economic laws. On the whole, it
seems truer to say that the character and force of competitive
tactics tend continually to change, as people learn what to expect
of their rivals and try new ways of adjusting themselves to the
rivalry. Therefore the character of competition seems to depend
partly on how long a given type of competitive contact has been
in operation. Competition may tend to settle down to a sort
of stalemate unless fresh areas and types of competitive contacts
142. John M. Clark, Alternative to Serfdom 61 et seq. (1948).
143. Id. at 68.
144. Id. at 66.
145. Id. at 62.
146. Id. at 72.
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are continually being opened up; for example, by improved
transportation bringing new producers into a market, or by
the starting of new enterprises or the introduction of new
processes or new products. Competition needs to be dynamic;
if it gets to obeying fixed and rigid laws, it is already half-dead.
The fixed formulations of economic theory are statements of
what might be, but seldom accurate descriptions of what is.
The requirements of neat theoretical formulations and those of a
healthy living organism are not the same.'1
14 6a
THE LEGAL MEANING OF MONOPOLY
While the economists and other social theorists have been de-
bating the meaning of "competition" the courts have been con-
cerned with defining "monopoly." The reason for this difference
is the diverse tasks that they perform. The economists were con-
cerned to observe the phenomena of economic action and then con-
struct a conceptual model that would serve either as a norm or an
explanation for the working of the actual system. The concept of
competition was an important working part of of the economic
model. However, the competition found in practice constantly
varied from the competition postulated in one or another conceptual
scheme. Consequently the economic theorists have been concerned
to create a concept of competition that would have consistency and
theoretical validity and also correspond to reality. They have had
little difficulty with monopoly since for them, it was simply an
abstraction opposed to competition and did not require to be
brought into correspondence with any particular observed
phenomena.
In contrast, the courts have not been concerned with setting
standards for desirable conduct, but in defining that conduct which
is socially so undesirable as to be proscribed by law. As mentioned
before, this is the method required by our legal tradition and culture
pattern. To prohibit anti-social acts and leave the individual free to
follow his conscience or whim in all else appears to be likely to leave
a much wider area of individual freedom than to prescribe the
norms of conduct that are thought to be most desirable and then
punish those who do not conform. At any rate, that is the judgment
of our society and the method of our law.
The law applicable to economic conduct does not, therefore, re-
quire competition; rather it prohibits monopoly. Theoretically com-
petition and monopoly are grammatical antonyms and logical op-
posites. So it would seem that an adequate definition of one would
necessarily imply the definition of the other. But where the defini-
146a. Id. at 72.
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tion required is a working definition applicable to factual situations,
this does not follow. Thus the economists define monopoly easily,
but struggle long and hard over competition. The courts, on the
other hand, are not concerned to waste much thought on the nature
of competition, but labor mightly in describing monopoly.
The difficulty that the courts have in defining monopoly is the
same one and arises from the same causes as the difficulty of the
economists in defining competition. The problem of definition arises
for the courts only when some particular case is presented in which
it is charged that some specific factual situation is monopolistic. But
facts are recalcitrant and do not easily fit into the neat patterns
of theory. So the courts have found that, with perhaps a single
exception, they are never faced with a situation corresponding to
the economic definition of monopoly and apparently are unlikely
ever to find such facts.147 Hox-,ever, faced with the necessity of
applying abstract principles to a practical world for the purpose
of achieving actual results, it becomes appropriate, and indeed
inevitable, that the concepts embodied in the principles be modified
and adapted to the facts as found. Consequently the courts have
broadened the concept of monopoly, which is their working tool in
this field, until it includes a large part of the continuum starting
with the limiting case of a "perfect monopoly" and reaching to-
ward the concept of competition.
The economists, on the other hand, have started from the op-
posite end of the scale. They have retained monopoly as an abstract
limiting case, but have modified and adapted their notions of com-
petition to correspond with observed facts until economic com-
petition has come also to include a large part of the continuum
starting with the limiting case of "perfect competition" and reaching
toward the concept of monopoly.
It is, therefore, neither surprising nor logically improper for the
legal concept of monopoly occasionally to overlap the economic
concept of competition. Ideally the competition-monopoly continuum
should be divided by a line somewhere down the middle, on one
side of which lies economic competition and on the other side of
which lies legal monopoly. If the economists were successful in
defining their concept of competition so as to include as much of
the competition-monopoly continuum as contains conduct which is
socially desirable, and if the courts were able to define their concept
147. The only reported case that appears to involve a "perfect" or com-
plete monopoly is United States v. Pullman, 50 F. Supp. 123 (1943); subse-
quent proceedings, 53 F. Supp. 908 (1944) ; 55 F. Supp. 985 (1944); 64 F.
Supp. 108 (1946), aff'd, 330 U. S. 806.
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of monopoly so as to include so much of the competition-monopoly
continuum as contains conduct which is socially undesirable, and
if the judgment of the economists and the courts on this matter
coincided perfectly, then there would be such a line. Obviously
these conditions will not be met. Neither economists nor judges
are perfect, and there are other apparent reasons. It follows that
so long as the economists use competition as their working con-
ceptual tool, and so long as the courts use monopoly as their work-
ing conceptual tool, and so long as perfection is elusive, the two
concepts will occasionally overlap and some conduct may be com-
petition to the economists and monopolistic to the lawyers. This
does not indicate that either is wrong, or even that one or the
other must be in error. Since the standards of judgment will neces-
sarily differ, it may well be that each is correctly applying his own
standard in such a case. (For the purposes of simplifying this
discussion I am disregarding individual errors and variations in
judgment and considering the matter as though the economic and
legal judgments were either those of single individuals on each
side or of groups of like-minded individuals.)
In general, however, it would seem that lawyers and economists
are, or should be, using substantially similar standards in construct-
ing their conceptual models in this field. The antitrust laws deal only
with economic activity. Their purpose is to establish some standard
of desirable and undesirable conduct on the basis of economic con-
sequences. This, in turn, is also the ostensible standard of those
economists who hold that a competitive, as distinguished from a
socialist or nationalist, economy is the most fruitful and desirable.
Consequently it would seem that-making due allowances for dif-
ferences in viewpoint and human error-there should ordinarily
be some consonance between the legal definition of monopoly and
the economic definition of competition. Thus, except for the rare
case in which it may be decided to allow inconsistency, with refer-
ence to economic behaviour within this field that which is not legal
monopoly should be economic competition, and that which is not
economic competition should be legal monopoly.
This is by no means the same dichotomy as that of the early
classical economists who divided all market situations into those
which represented either pure competition or monopoly. Quite to
the contrary, this classification contemplates that within each
category of legal monopoly and economic competition there shall
be elements of "perfect competition" and of "perfect monopoly"
intermingled in what Chamberlin has called monopolistic com-
19531
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petition. This analysis demonstrates that within situations which
are economically competitive there may be elements which are
monopolistic; that within situations which are legally monopolistic
there may be elements which are competitive; and that in almost
every situation this must be the case. Competition and monopoly
(or "perfect competition" and "perfect monopoly") remain as ab-
stractions which are limiting cases only. Legal monopoly and
economic competition are practical concepts which apply to the
actual economy and, at least roughly, divide the field of economic
behaviour into two categories which are, respectively, illegal or
undesirable and desirable or legal. Thus the economic consideration
of competition, which has been reviewed, becomes directly relevant
to the legal problem of defining monopoly. It remains to consider
the cases.
The first case which it is useful to consider in seeking to find
the present views of the courts is the Standard Oil case.148 This
is the decision which announced the famous "rule of reason" that
has caused so much confusion among those who seek to reduce the
decisions to definite principles. The court in the Standard Oil
case starts by observing that the views urged upon it in the argu-
ment on the case as to the meaning of the Sherman Act are "as
wide apart as the poles." It therefore undertakes to make a rather
extensive review of the background and interpretation of the law,
with particular reference to its application to an alleged monopoly.
It is observed that the congressional debates show that doubt as
to whether there was a common law of the United States relating
to monopoly was among the influences leading to passage of the
act. More than this:
"They conclusively show, however, that the main cause
which led to the legislation was the thought that it was required
by the economic condition of the times; that is, the vast accumu-
lation of wealth in the hands of corporations and individuals,
the enormous development of corporate organization, the facility
for combination which such organizations afforded, the fact that
the facility was being used, and that combinations known as
trusts were being multiplied, and the widespread impression
that their power had been and would be exerted to oppress in-
dividuals and injure the public generally."' 49
The court says that at common law monopoly meant the grant
of an exclusive right over a part of trade by the sovereign and that
there was no prohibition against the creation of a monopoly by an
individual since it was then supposed that monopoly could arise
148. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
149. Id. at 50.
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only from the act of the sovereign. However, in this country acts
which gave rise to the same harmful consequences as those ascribed
to monopoly came to be spoken of as monopoly also. In other
words, practical common sense caused attention to be concentrated
not upon the theoretically correct name, but upon the evils aimed
at and the acts which caused them. As modem conditions arose,
legislation and judicial decisions came more and more to adapt the
recognized legal restrictions to new manifestations of conduct and
of dealing which were thought to involve the evils aimed at. The
court then announces its view of the proper interpretation of the
Sherman Act:
"Without going into detail, and but very briefly surveying
the whole field, it may be with accuracy said that the dread
of enhancement of prices and of other wrongs which it was
thought would flow from the undue limitation on competitive
conditions caused by contracts or other acts of individuals or
corporations led, as a matter of public policy, to the prohibition
or treating as illegal all contracts or acts which were unreason-
ably restrictive of competitive conditions, either from the nature
or character of the contract or act, or where the surrounding
circumstances were such as to justify the conclusion that they
had not been entered into or performed with the legitimate pur-
pose of reasonably forwarding personal interest and developing
trade, but, on the contrary, were of such a character as to give
rise to the inference or presumption that they had been entered
into or done with the intent to do wrong to the general public
and to limit the right of individuals, thus restraining the free
flow of commerce and tending to bring about the evils, such
as enhancement of prices, which were considered to be against
public policy."'' L04.. as the contracts or acts embraced in the provision were
not expressly defined .. . it inevitably follows that the pro-
vision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which
required that some standard should be resorted to for the pur-
pose of determining whether the prohibition contained in the
statute had or had not in any given case been violated. Thus
not specifying, but indubitably contemplating and requiring a
standard, it follows that it was intended that the standard of
reason which had been applied at the common law and in this
country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by
the statute was intended to be the measure used for the pur-
pose of determining whether, in a given case, a particular act
had or had not brought about the wrong against which the
statute provided."'' 1
The court then observes that the reference in the act to "any part"
of commerce has both a geographical and distributive significance,
150. Id. at 58.
151. Id. at 60.
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so that it includes any portion of the country and any one of the
classes of things involved in commerce. The court adds that the
word "monopolize" includes "every act bringing about the pro-
hibited result.'
1 52
The opinion is extremely long and, at least from the viewpoint
of more than four eventful decades later, somewhat confused. How-
ever, a fair interpretation seems to be that the rule of reason was
not meant to permit acts which were only slightly or moderately
injurious to competition, but was the court's way of stating that
the law prohibited acts which by their character were not normal
competitive business methods but were, rather, methods tending
to or aimed as a restriction of competition.
This view is, indeed, virtually what the court itself said in ex-
plaining the Standard Oil decision just two weeks after it was
announced. In the American Tobacco case (1911) the court eluci-
dated the rule of reason announced in its earlier decision:
"In that [Standard Oil] case it was held, without departing
from any previous decision of the court, that as the statute had
not defined the words 'restraint of trade,' it became necessary
to construe those words, -a duty which could only be dis-
charged by a resort to reason .... ,,53
"It was therefore pointed out that the statute did not forbid
or restrain the power to make normal and usual contracts to
further trade by resorting to all normal methods, whether by
agreement or otherwise, to accomplish such purpose. In other
words, it was held not that acts which the statute prohibited
could be removed from the control of its prohibitions by a find-
ing that they were reasonable, but that the duty to interpret,
which inevtibaly arose from the general character of the terms
'restraint of trade,' required that the words 'restraint of trade'
should be given a meaning which would not destroy the individ-
ual right to contract, and render difficult, if not impossible, any
movement of trade in the channels of interstate commerce, -the
free movement of which it was the purpose of the statute to
protect."' 54
The court then explains that by giving to the statute a reason-
able construction all the difficulties created by the complicated
forms in which the assailed transactions are clothed become of no
moment, because just as a reasonable construction excludes all
normal and usual business contracts from the scope of the statute, so
it also brings within that scope:
every conceivable act which could possibly come within
152. Id. at 61.
153. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 106, 178-179
(1911).
154. Id. at 179-180.
[Vol. 37:505
ANTITRUST AND THE NEW ECONOMICS
,he spirit or purpose of the prohibitions of the law, without
regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed. That is to
say, it was held that, in view of the general language of the
statute and the public policy which it manifested, there was no
possibility of frustrating that policy by resorting to any disguise
or subterfuge of form, since resort to reason rendered it im-
possible to escape, by any indirection, the prohibitions of the
statute."1,5
Applying this view of its rule, the court holds that the combina-
tion here attacked as monopolistic is in fact such, since its history
is replete with acts which it was the obvious purpose of the statute
to forbid, as they are demonstrative of a purpose to acquire dominion
and control of the tobacco trade by driving competitors out of
business.
The next important decision of the Supreme Court in a mon-
opoly case was rendered nearly a decade later in 1920, and involved
the United States Steel Corporation.Y56 The force of the decision
as precedent is somewhat diminished by the division of the judges
which the controversy engendered. The prevailing opinion was
joined in by four of the nine justices; three justices dissented, and
two did not participate. Nevertheless this case seems to be the
origin of the doctrine that mere size is not a violation of the antitrust
laws.
The prevailing opinion of the court states that the law is clear
in its denunciation of monopoly and equally clear in its direction
that the courts shall prevent and restrain monopoly.157 On the other
hand, the law does not compel competition. 5 8 Although merely pass-
ing comments in the decision, these dicta reflect fundamental con-
siderations in our legal system which have been noted previously.
The court declares that in both the Standard Oil and American
Tobacco cases it was dealing with persistent and systematic law-
breakers masquerading under legal forms which had acquired and
exercised power by "brutal" methods. However, the district court
had found the Steel Company absolutely guiltless of such conduct
in the present case, and the Supreme Court agrees. Furthermore, it
finds a contradictory paradox in the government's case, as it is
urged both that the Steel Company's competitors were oppressed
by its superior power, and also that they ascended to opulence by
following its prices. The court says that concerted action by the
Steel Company and its competitors is not asserted and so is not an
155. Id. at 181.
156. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
157. Id. at 452.
158. Id. at 451.
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issue in the case. Thus the court is brought to the issue whether
* mere size is an offense:
"The corporation is undoubtedly of impressive size, and it
takes an effort of resolution not to be affected by it or to exag-
gerate its influence. But we must adhere to the law, and the
law does not make mere size an offense or the existence of un-
exerted power an offense. It, we repeat, requires overt acts....,1 5
The Supreme Court concludes that it agrees with the lower
court that the corporation has not achieved monopoly. Since the
statute is directed against monopoly and not against its mere ex-
pectation, the corporation has not violated the statute.
The dissenting opinion agrees that mere size is not an offense
against the statute.160 However, it says a dominating power over
the market may not be derived from conspiracies or combinations
in restraint of trade, and it argues that by combining companies
controlling approximately half the steel business of the country the
defendants have combined to monopolize and restrain trade. 16'
As in so many cases, the judges here seem to have come to
irreconciliable conclusions concerning the facts from the same evi-
dence. But the basic principles which both sides seek to apply to
the evidence do not differ materially. The prevailing judges were
much impressed with evidence presented by the Steel Company
from both competitors and customers indicating that the defendant
did not dominate the market and that competition remained sub-
stantially unimpaired by the combinations attacked. The dissent-
ing judges were obviously unimpressed with this testimony. All of
the judges took as the touchstone of determination whether or not
the conduct complained of had diminished competition.
This principle was made explicit a few years later in the Inter-
national Harvester decision. 62 There the court reiterates: "The
law, however, does not make the mere size of a corporation, how-
ever impressive, or the existence of unexerted power on its part,
an offense, when unaccompanied by unlawful conduct in the exercise
of its power."'' 6 3
The court then specifically holds that the establishment of com-
petitive conditions in the trade constitutes a complaince with the
requirements of the law.
Although these opinions seem to indicate that "size" as such
cannot constitute monopolization, close analysis of the factors dis-
159. Id. at 451.
160. Id. at 460.
161. Id. at 461 et seq.
162. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927).
163. Id. at 708.
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cussed by the court in each case indicates that there was careful
consideration given to the questions whether the defendants had
acquired and exercised a power to dominate the market or to take
unfair advantage of competitors. This is recognized by the dictum
of Justice Cardozo in the Swift case:
"Mere size, according to the holding of this court, is not an
offense against the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point
at which it amounts to monopoly ...but size carries with it
an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the op-
portunity is proved to have been utilized in the past."' 164
Inherent in the first part of this dictum is the suggestion that
perhaps it may be illegal for a business merely to be of such magni-
tude as to constitute a monopoly, regardless of other considerations.
This, of course, is the concept which the pro-big antitrust critics
have recently been reading into the law and have been most vigorous
in denouncing. There are two grave difficulties in testing this
criticism. The first is that size and monopoly are by no means
corresponding concepts. In fact, it is quite meaningless to speak
literally of "mere size" in connection with this problem. Size is
simply a nonsense syllable unless taken in relation to some standard
of measurement. There are at least half a dozen obvious and dif-
ferent standards that may be used to measure magnitude in a
business enterprise:
1. The dollar value of the total assets or of the total production
of the business.
2. The number of physical units produced or extent of the
physical plant.
3. The proportion of the total national product produced or of
the total national assets possessed by the business.
4. The number and variety of classes of commodities produced.
5. The relative magnitude of the enterprise, measured by any
of the foregoing standards, as compared to the competitors
of the enterprise.
6. The proportion of the total market in which it is engaged
that is controlled by the enterprise.
Although the courts from time to time have spoken of size as
such, without qualifying adjectives, it is quite apparent from a
reading of the cases that size has always been considered as sig-
nificant only in relation to the last standard suggested-the propor-
tion of the market which is controlled by the enterprise in question.
This, of course, involves measurement of size by dollars or physical
164. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U. S. 106, 116 (1932).
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units and comparison of this measurement with other measure-
ments, including those of the competitors. Nevertheless, the courts
have never fallen into the error of taking size as an abstraction un-
related to the total market. The pro-big disciples such as Lilienthal,
who either ignore or overlook this fact are consequently talking
completely beside the point.
The second difficulty in dealing with the criticism of the judicial
attitude toward size arises from the fact that it assumes the case
of a big business which has acquired its size purely through the
force of legal and economic virtues without engaging in any im-
proper activities, and which is nevertheless outlawed or dissolved
by the antitrust laws simply because of "size." This poses an in-
superable difficulty due to the happenstance that there is no such
case-the difficulty is purely imaginary. The closest the courts have
ever come to confronting this imaginary situation as is in the Pull-
man case. 65 There the court observed that the defendant had, over
the years, acquired all of its competitors by non-predatory prac-
tices, until it was in the unique position of controlling 100% of the
business in its field. Had these facts stood alone the court might
have had the hypothetical problem referred to:
"If this were all we had in the case we should face the diffiuclt
question whether a violation of the Sherman Act is involved
where a business enterprise, admittedly engaged in interstate
commerce, has acquired the sole possession of the field by
absorption, in non-predatory fashion, of all of its com-
petitors."1 6
".[However], the facts presented in evidence constitute, in our
opinion, an infraction of the monopoly section of the statute,
that is section 2. We have here defendants who are not only the
sole purveyors of sleeping car service, but who got themselves
into that position by buying out competitors with the express
intent, as recorded in their own corporate minutes, of elimi-
nating what they pleased to call 'useless competition.' Then
having acquired the sole possession of the field they so arranged
matters that no one else can enter it. ' ' 1 67
The court reviews a number of specific practices engaged in by
the defendants for the purpose of excluding competitors, and con-
cludes that there has clearly been monopolization in violation of law.
The case that is most often cited for the proposition that size
alone may violate the antitrust laws (and the only case relied on
165. United States v. Pullman Co 50 F. Supp. 123 (1943); subsequent
proceedings, 53 F. Supp. 908 (1944); 5 F. Supp. 985 (1944) ; 64 F. Supp.
108 (1946), aff'd, 330 U. S. 806.
166. Id. at 126.
167. Id. at 134.
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by Lilienthal) is the Alcoa case,168 which followed the Pullman
case by two years. Here, however, Judge Hand expressly reserved
this point:
"It does not follow because 'Alcoa' had such a monopoly
that it 'monopolized' the ingot market: it may not have achieved
monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust upon it .... It is
unquestionably true that from the very outset the courts have
at least kept in reserve the possibility that the origin of a
monopoly may be critical in determining its legality; and for
this they had warrant in some of the congressional debate which
accompanied the passage of the Act.... This motion has usually
been expressed by saying that size does not determine guilt;
that there must be some 'exclusion' of competitors; that the
growth must be something else than 'natural' or 'normal'; that
there must be 'wrongful intent,' or some other specific intent;
or that some 'unduly' coercive means must be used .... What
engendered these compunctions is reasonably plain; persons
may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly,
automatically so to say: that it, without having intended either
to put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition
from arising when none had existed; they may become monopo-
listic by force of accident.... A market may, for example, be
so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the
cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply
the whole demand. Or there may be changes in taste or in cost
which drive out all but one purveyor. A single producer may be
the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by
virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases
a strong argument can be made that, although the result may
expose the public to the evils of monopoly, the Act does not
mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which it is
its prime object to foster."16
The court follows this discussion of principles by emphatically
rejecting the proposition that Alcoa was the passive beneficiary of
monopoly following upon the involuntary elimination of competitors
through automatically operating economic forces. The court finds
that Alcoa clearly sought to strengthen its position in the market
by a number of unlawful practices, and further finds that many
transactions which were neutral on their face in fact were not
necessary to the development of Alcoa's business and had no motive
except to exclude others and to perpetuate Alcoa's hold upon the
market. The case thus presented is not simply that of a business
which has grown great by competing-that is seeking business for
itself-but which has deliberately and aggressively sought to elimi-
168. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
169. Id. at 429-430.
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nate and exclude competitors from the market, and which has
succeeded to the extent of securing nearly complete market domi-
nance. This, the court has no difficulty in holding, constitutes
monopolizing.
There is language in the Alcoa case indicating that continuous
expansion of its facilities to meet new demand was one of the factors
considered by the court as tending to show exclusion of competitors.
However, as in all judicial opinions this language must be read
in the context of the facts of the case. So read, it is clear that the
court is not condemning business growth or expansion as such, but
only expansion which is coupled with an intent and tendency to
secure dominating power over a market or, what comes to the same
thing, eliminate or exclude competition.170
The Alcoa decision has special prestige by virtue of the fact that
the year after its rendition the Supreme Court welcomed the oppor-
tunity to endorse it, and cited it as supporting the view that:
".. . the material consideration in determining whether a
monopoly exists is not that prices are raised and that competi-
tion actually is excluded but that power exists to raise prices
or to exclude competition when it is desired to do so.'17'
This idea is elaborated in the Griffith case where the Supreme
Court reverses the decision of a lower court for failure to hold
that the exercise of monopoly power to gain competitive advantage
is a violation of the law.1 7 2 The court says that it is immaterial
whether or not there was a specific intent either to violate the law
or to build a monopoly. Such intent is necessary only where the
acts are not sufficient in themselves to produce the prohibited re-
sult, but require other acts in addition in order to create a dangerous
probability that monopoly will occur. But where particular con-
duct actually causes restraint of trade or monopoly, no further
showing of intent is required. No monopolist monopolizes uncon-
scious of what he is doing.1 7-
The court uses language which, taken alone, might be construed
to say that the mere possession of monopoly power, whether law-
fully or unlawfully acquired and whether exercised or not, con-
stitutes a violation of the antitrust laws. 7 4 But this is followed by
170. This is the view of the Alcoa decision taken by the Supreme Court.
See United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 107 (1948). Note also that the
Alcoa case is cited by appellants as authority for the proposition that, "A
monopoly is not illegal per se," in Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342
U. S. 143 (1951).
171. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781, 811, 813
(1946).
172. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100 (1948).
173. Id. at 105.
174. Id. at 107.
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the qualification that the possession of monopoly power must be
coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power in order
to violate the law. The court states that it is unreasonable per se to
foreclose competitors from any substantial market, said:
"It follows a fortiori that the use of monopoly power, how-
ever lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a com-
petitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is unlawful.' 17 5
It thus fairly appears from the cases that as an abstract propo-
sition, the mere possession of market power sufficiently great to
constitute a monopoly does not violate the law without more. How-
ever, monopolistic market power is a violation of law if it has been
(a) acquired with monopolistic intent, or (b) maintained, or (c)
expanded, or (d) used, with monopolistic intent or effect. Ex-
amined realistically this seems to allow almost no practical possi-
bility for the existence of that hypothetical passive and innocent
monopoly which is not unlawful. This does not indicate that the
courts are being unfair or unrealistic or that they are condemning
"big business" as such. Rather, it much more logically leads to the
conclusion that the pro-big apologists are being ridiculously hypo-
thetical and unrealistic when they seek to use such an example
to belabor the courts. Legal doctrine still allows for the possibility
of the innocent possession of monopoly power. But after more
than half a century of experience with the antitrust laws the courts
have found as a practical matter that monopoly power simply is not
acquired or maintained in the real economic world by fortuitous
accident; that the metamorphosis of a competitor into a monopo-
list does not happen innocently. The experience of the courts to the
present day serves further to confirm the conclusion of Justice
Brandeis that "no monopoly in private industry in America has yet
been attained by efficiency alone. No business has been so superior
to its competitors in the processes of manufacture or of distribu-
tion as to enable it to control the market solely by reason of its
superiority.'
7 6
Examining the course of judicial decisions over the years in the
light of economic theory leads persuasively to the conclusion that in
the adoption of applicable criteria of monopoly the courts have
tended to be reasonably realistic. There is certainly loose language
in decisions from time to time, although there is remarkably little
even of this in the opinions of the Supreme Court. On the whole,
however, the judicial definition of legal monopoly has been worked
175. Id. at 107.
176. Quoted by Justice Douglas, dissenting, in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 534 (1948).
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out, as it theoretically should be, to include that area of economic
activity which is not within the ambit of normal competition. The
courts have come with increasing frequency to explicit recognition
of this dichotomy by expression such as the recent one of the
Supreme Court:
"The heart of our national economic policy long has
been faith in the value of competition. In the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, 'Con-
gress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect,
and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.' ,1"77 ,
It is apparent that from the viewpoint of this philosophy a
prohibition against monopoly does not exhaust the field of threats
to competition. There may be, and as a matter of common knowl-
edge actually are, many practices which are patently injurious to
normal competition but which do not, at least in their initial stages,
rise to the level of threatening imminent monopoly. These practices
Congress has sought to include within the legal ban by the prohibi-
tion against "restraint of trade." Although the concepts of restraint
of trade and monopoly had wholly different legal origins, and his-
torically, have somewhat different legal meanings, they have been
tending to coalesce in the recent thinking of the courts. In the Alcoa
decision, for example, it is observed that the vice of restrictive
combinations and of monopoly is the same, being the denial to
commerce of the protection of competition.178 In the Griffith case
it is said that the things condemned as monopoly are, in large
measure, the end products of the conduct which violates the provi-
sion against restraint of trade.179 Most recently the Supreme Court
has added an illuminating gloss to the rule of reason:
"A restraint may be unreasonable either because a restraint
otherwise reasonable is accompanied with a specific intent to
accomplish a forbidden restraint or because it falls within the
class of restraints that are illegal per se. For example, where a
complaint charges that the defendants have engaged in price
fixing, or have concertedly refused to deal with non-members of
an association, or have licensed a patented device on condition
that unpatented materials be employed in conjunction with the
patented device, then the amount of commerce involved is im-
material because such restraints are illegal per se.' '180
This view is essentially similar to the one taken in the first
American Tobacco case, but it does represent a somewhat more
felicitous use of words and substantially greater economic sophisti-
177. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U. S. 231, 248-249 (1951).
178. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 428 (2d
Cir. 1945).
179. United States v. Griffith, 334 U. S. 100, 106 (1948).
180. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U. S. 495, 522 (1948).
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cation. The difference in expression clearly reflects the fact that
between 1911 and 1948 the Court has observed a large number of
practices which it classifies as "unreasonable" because injurious to
competition and so does not feel constrained to express itself in
merely abstract terms. Consequently the court now states rather
clearly that any practice is a restraint of trade which (a) regardless
of its character is engaged in with monopolistic intent, or (b) has a
tendency to lessen competition because of its nature, regardless of
intent, if it is not a normal method of competition. Without ex-
ploring all of the minor legal qualifications and ramifications, it
may thus fairly be concluded that restraint of trade includes any act
or practice which has either a monopolistic intent or tendency.
Monopoly is thus again emphasized as the central concept in
our antitrust policy. This, in turn, requires that in determining the
scope and application of the antitrust laws the courts shall not rely
upon historical legal precedent but must have resort consideration
of contemporary economic criteria.
That such necessity is now recognized by the Supreme Court
is indicated by the Columbia Steel decision. This case raised the
unusual issue as to when vertical integration would create such
market power as to amount to monopoly. The court split sharply
on the facts, rendering a five to four decision. Since the precise
situation cannot conceivably arise again, the holding as to the
factual situation has little value as precedent. However, all of the
justices showed a clear realization that the controversy must be
determined by the weighing of economic considerations rather than
by seeking for illusory legal precedents.
The majority opinion in the Columbia Steel case discusses the
necessity of defining the market both geographically 81 and in terms
of classes of commodities8 2 before dealing with the problem of
monopoly. It then indicates what is thought to be the proper func-
tion of the courts in applying the antitrust policy:
"It is not for the courts to determine the course of the
Nation's economic development... . On the other hand, the
courts have been given by Congress wide powers in monopoly
regulation. The very broadness of terms such as restraint of
trade, substantial competition and purpose to monopolize have
placed upon the courts the responsibility to apply the Sherman
Act so as to avoid the evils at which Congress aimed."'" 3
"In determining what constitutes unreasonable restraint,
we do not think the dollar volume is in itself of compelling
significance; we look rather to the percentage of business con-
181. Id. at 508, 520.
182. Id. at 510 et seq.
183. Id. at 526.
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trolled, the strength of the remaining competition, whether the
action springs from business requirements or purpose to
monopolize, the probable development of the industry, consumer
demands, and other characteristics of the market. We do not
undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures by which to
measure the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement of its
activities by the purchase of the assets of a competitor. The
relative effect of percentage command of a market varies with
the setting in which that factor is placed. ' '1 84
T3HE CURRENT ROLE OF ANTITRUST
Even from this summary survey of the economic, social and legal
rationale of the antitrust policy some conclusions emerge which
appear to have considerable significance for the function, interpreta-
tion and future role of the laws.
One of the first and most obvious points is that the problem of eco-
nomic power-its exercise and control-is much more complicated, at
least in modem society, than earlier theorists, economic and legal,
had any inkling of. Both competition and monopoly have turned
out to be highly complex, rather than simple, concepts; and in
operation each has proved to have a protean character. Actual
economic behaviour is less subject to predictable laws than had
been supposed, and analysis of the economy has disclosed more
variables than early theory had taken into account. The mechanism
of economic self-regulation has, as a consequence, been found to
be much more intricate than previously thought. This conclusion
must inevitably permeate and color all serious thinking on this
subject. Those who have the most knowledge on this subject are
thus likely to be that least dogmatic in their conclusions and the
most receptive to the impact of new data and the influence of new
ideas. In our present state of enlightenment, only the ignorant can
be certain of conclusions. Fully mindful of this, the rest of the con-
clusions in this essay are offered as the most probably and reason-
able inference from present data and theories, not as eternal or
immutable truths.
Although modem economic criticism and theory has consider-
ably refined and modified the classical theory, it has by no means
discredited or wholly outmoded all of the classical principles. For
example, the criticism of Adam Smith's theory of monopoly pricing
based upon the argument that a monopolist cannot, in modern
times, indefinitely secure high prices for his product, actually tends
to prove the fundamental validity of the classical theory. The
argument is that sooner or later modern technology and enterprise
184. Id. at 527-528.
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will devise and offer to the public some substitute for the monopo-
lized product. But this is saying no more than that technology is
capable of introducing competition into almost any monopoly
situation. It is not, and has not been contended that the inevitable
tendency of monopoly is not toward uneconomic prices and in-
efficiency. It is contended merely that a monopoly cannot be main-
tained indefinitely in the circumstances of a modem technological
society. Thus, when analyzed this argument does not detract at
all from the force of the classical conception of the effects of
monopoly and competition, but merely suggests that competition
is more assertive and viable in modern industrial society than the
older economic theories had postulated.
Actually the newer economic theories probably do little more
than incorporate into the body of economic theory an account of
conditions which either did not exist or had little significant effect
more than a century ago. In the eighteenth century the concept of
the market was closely identified with a definite geographical place.
Today it is necessary to emphasize that geographical extent is one
of the dimensions of the market that must be determined before
considering competition or monopoly. Transportation and com-
munication have changed the geographical dimensions of nearly
all markets. Similarly, the variety of goods and of brands, the
effects of advertising and the difficulty of quality determination by
the buyer have made an analysis of the classes of commodities con-
cerned in competition and monopoly much more difficult. The de-
velopment of legal and of extra-legal forms of organization and the
growth of power groups on different sides of various markets have
added elements that must be taken into account. Government itself
has intruded into the picture with regulations, limitations of some
forms of competition, and other kinds of intervention that are in-
tended to and do influence economic behaviour in many ways. Con-
fusing and perplexing, but unavoidable, is the observation that
competition is characterized in practice by monopolistic elements
and monopoly by competitive elements, and that the pure forms
of either, if they ever existed, have disappeared.
Probably the most disturbing of all the conclusions that have been
forced upon us in the last two decades is that competition is not a
sufficient condition of economic equilibrium and prosperity. The
most serious error made by the classical economists was the sup-
position that competition, in any form or degree that is probable in
reality, would automatically guarantee a stable, prosperous and self-
regulating economy. The realization that competition alone is not
1953]
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enough to insure our economic welfare had been a long time in
coming, but Keynes was one who finally formulated it in theoretical
terms. Today, this conclusion is hardly questioned although many
still ostensibly cling to economic dogma that gives little explicit
recognition to this altered viewpoint. However, it is common to find
expressions such as this from a staunch editorial supporter of the
new Republican administration:
"But the new policy recognizes, as the Coolidge and Hoover
administrations did not, that government has a responsibility to
prevent depressions and the paralysis and suffering they
bring."18 5
Whether consciously or not, this attitude is based upon the eco-
nomic theories of Keynes as much as the faith in competition is
upon those of Smith. In classical theory government's only role is
to maintain competition; that will insure that any economic dis-
equilibrium will eventually right itself. Government cannot and
should not seek to improve matters by meddling with the free play
of economic forces, regardless of whether or not temporary hard-
ship may come to some segments of the population.
Peculiarly enough, those who are the last most loyal devotees
of the doctrine of competition as an adequate regulation of the
economy are the ones who are counted as antagonistic to big busi-
ness as such. Some few of the anti-big group still cling to the faith
that all our troubles are traceable to the growth of monopolistic
business and the decline of competition. They still devoutly believe
that if only the government would strengthen the antitrust laws and
enforce them vigorously enough, then our economy would approach
its utopian best. They argue that the depressions of the 1930's
were due to the merger movements and decline of competition in
the 1920's, and that we could, if we would, restore competition to a
state something like the classical model. This, they seem to say, is
all that is required for our economic welfare.
Actually those who argue in this vein, or even close to it, are
tending to discredit, rather than strengthen, the policy and support
of the antitrust laws. One is doing no favor to a friend who insists
that he is paragon of superlative virtues. Such a description can
lead only to disillusionment. Insistence that competition alone is a
sufficient condition of economic welfare can lead only to discrediting
the legitimate role and importance of competition. It simply is no
longer credible that restraint of trade is the cause of all our woes,
or that competition is the cure for all of them.
185. Editorial in the Minneapolis Star, April 23, 1953, p. 8.
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The public and the economists are by now well aware that there
are numerous government policies in addition to antitrust which
play important and perhaps vital functions in directing and in-
fluencing economic activity. Indeed, there are numerous activities
and policies of government-in addition to antitrust-which have a
direct bearing on the maintenance of competition. Most patent are
the policies involving regulation and requiring certificates of public
convenience and necessity to be issued by a regulatory authority
before any competition is allowed. The theory of such regulation is
that those enterprises which are permitted to operate in the field,
as compensation for being controlled as public utilities should be
protected against competition, with the argument sometimes added
that this will, in some way, conduce to greater efficiency or serv-
ice.""0 More subtle, but also more pervasively effective are the effects
of government policy in such matters as the control and allocation
of materials, the awarding of government contracts, the granting of
tax favors such as amortization and depletion allowances, the con-
struction of the tax scale, and the whole burden of compliance with
regulations, record keeping and reports. There can be little doubt
that in the related matters of material allocations under the war
powers, 8 7 awarding government contracts,'"s and granting rapid
tax amortization privileges,s" the government itself has favored
big business at the expense of small business, and thus has con-
tributed in some degree to the concentration of economic power.
If economic concentration has thereby been increased and com-
petition diminished-which seems most likely-this is a matter
186. See Chicago, Rock Island & P. R. R. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
21 U. S. L. Week 2420 (Illinois, Mar. 3, 1953) ; Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf,
Colorado & S. F. Ry., 270 U. S. 266 (1926).
187. See Report on Material Shortages by the Select Committee on
Small Business, U. S. Senate, 82 Cong., 1st Sess., Sen. Report No. 77.
188. See David Lynch, The Concentration of Economic Power 3 et
seq. (1946) ; also hearings and report of Select Committee on Small Business,
U. S. Senate, on Participation of Small Business in Government Procure-
ment (1950).
189. See Bruce Catton, Taxes Into Profits, The Nation, April 11, 1953,
176:304. In this, most recent of the references, it is reported that in the basic
industries in which the bulk of tax amortization certificates have been granted
small business represents 35% of the employment but has been granted only
107 of the value of the certificates granted, and accounts for 23% of the appli-
cations denied. These certificates permit the cost of new plant facilities and
equipment to be amortized and written off through depreciation in a period
much shorter than the actual physical life of the facilities. Since all of these
facilities are employed in defense production under government contract,
and since allowable costs for tax purposes are similarly allowable for con-
tract renegotiation purposes, the government is, in effect, paying for these
facilities. As facilities such as a steel mill, aluminum plant, electric power
plant, or transportation equipment will be productive and profitable even for
non-defense purposes, this program amounts to a substantial government
subsidy for big business.
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which the antitrust laws can neither prevent nor do much to cure.
The remedy, if one is required, must be political.
Such policies do, however, accentuate the importance of anti-
trust. There are many government activities which promote eco-
nomic centralization and concentration; there are some which are
at least capable of exerting some indirect deterrent influence. But
antitrust still stands as the only government policy or activity
which is capable of directly or effectively opposing the formation or
exercise of monopoly power, and perhaps even more important, it
stands as the only government weapon to discourage collusion
among competitors-which is an even greater threat to our welfare
under modern conditions than the traditional form of naked monopoly
power. Although all experience to date has indicated that the in-
creasing burdens of government regulation, reporting and record
keeping, and taxation bear more heavily upon small than upon
large business, thus favoring concentration of economic activity,
it is at least theoretically possible for these trends to be reversed and
for government policies to be so shaped as to favor less rather than
more concentrated aggregations of business enterprise. But any
possible effects from such policies, assuming them to be politically
possible and economically practicable, are bound to be indirect and
long-range. Even taxation has been a relatively ineffectual weapon
against monopoly, compared to antitrust. Further, it seems im-
possible to conceive of any government policy other than anti-
trust which could even touch the problem of potential collusion
among enterprisers in markets of few enterprises.
Thus the conclusion that antitrust is not a sufficient condition
of economic welfare must not lead to the fallacious inference that
it is not a necessary one. Because water is not sufficient to sustain
man does not indicate that it is not essential to man's health.
There is nothing in any of the new economic theories to minimize
the importance of competition as an essential condition for the
proper functioning of the economy. Indeed, the newer theories
emphasize the importance of maintaining competition since they in-
dicate essential functions which it performs that were not con-
templated by the classical theory.
Drucker suggests that even in a relatively monopolistic situa-
tion, competition serves as a spur to and a yardstick of efficiency,
lacking which, any enterprise is almost certain to become inefficient.
Galbraith and Chamberlain point out that even in markets of few
sellers or buyers there are forces of competitive or countervailing
power at work so long as the few enterprises are not merged or
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combined by agreement or collusion. No matter how monopolistic
competition may become, monopolistic competition is still infinitely
better than none. Furthermore, the differences are those of degree;
and competition is effective for its purposes to the extent that it is
less monopolistic and more free in nature. Competition is the ele-
ment of flexibility in the economy that permits it to grow and adjust
to new conditions. Monopoly is hardening of our economic arteries.
While the ancient outcries against the evils of monopoly were
vehement enough, the increasing scope that modem technology
has given to business enterprise has made monopoly power less,
rather than more tolerable. As Quinn points out, when business
expands to the verges of monopoly on a national scale, its size be-
comes not a matter of efficiency or even gerater profits, but simply
a means to power. Most of the political philosophers have concluded
that the existence of great aggregations of concentrated power is in-
compatible with and has a tendency to the destruction of democratic
government. Many thus oppose the growth of giant economic enter-
prises on other than economic grounds. As Judge Learned Hand
observed in the Alcoa case, it is possible because of the indirect
social and moral effects to prefer a system of relatively small com-
petitive producers to one in which the great mass of men must
accept the direction of a few."" To secure the political, social and
moral benefits of diffused power was certainly one of the great
purposes of the antitrust laws.
It must not be imagined that differences in attitudes towards the
antitrust policy are reflections of differing attitudes towards busi-
ness generally. Emphasis on the importance of competition implies
that business is regarded as fruitful and important to society. On the
other hand, many if not most thoughtful businessmen recognize the
importance of maintaining competitive conditions and genuinely
support the antitrust laws. One of the most articulate and sagacious
of present business leaders is Paul G. Hoffman, who has recently
characterized the American economic system in six points: 1. It is
productive; 2. It distributes wealth widely; 3. It is flexible; 4. It
involves competition; 5. It is based on diffusion of economic power
and decision making; and 6. It involves self-reliance and co-opera-
tion in activities to expand markets, but not to fix prices.' 9' It must
'be obvious that each of these characteristics is served by the anti-
190. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1948).
191. Speech by Paul G. Hoffman Feb. 16, 1953 before the Minneapolis
Junior Chamber of Commerce at the Radisson Hotel, Minneapolis, Minne-




trust policy. While the'antitrust laws are not a sufficient condition
to insure the existence of any one of these characteristics, antitrust
is a necessary condition for the existence of all of them.
It is apparent from the analysis that has been made that most
of the criticisms of antitrust stem from an over-simplification of the
concepts and problems involved. Those who belong to the anti-
big school use the classical concept of competition, find it non-
existent, and conclude that antitrust either has not been or cannot
be effective. They overlook or disregard all the other operating
factors as well as using a false standard of competition. The pro-big
advocates, on the other hand, invoke the classical concept of
monopoly to show that no matter how big a business may get or how
much power it may acquire, it still is not really a monopoly. They
are also inclined to point to our economic ills as illustrations of
the inefficiency of competition and to attribute all our economic
benefits to the advantages of big business, thereby ignoring the host
of other circumstances involved.
The most troublesome point that remains, in spite of the formal
fallacies involved in these arguments, is the evidence of economic
concentration which appears in the statistics. 19 2 While the precise
figures vary depending upon the methods and measures used, it is
apparent that a very large proportion of business assets, employ-
ment and productivity are controlled by a very small number of
giant corporations. The difficulty in dealing with this data, how-
ever, is that we do not know what it means, either in terms of causes
or of effects upon competition. Disregarding for the moment the
government policies other than antitrust that may have more or
less responsible for this condition, it is by no means clear that the
growth in the number and size of large enterprises is not primarily
a reflection of the development of mass production methods in
industry. There are obviously going to be more and smaller pro-
ducers in a market in which handicraft production is the prevailing
mode than where machine production or mass production has been
adopted. So almost by definition, industry and business become
more concentrated in a mass production industrial economy.
192. See David Lynch, The Concentration of Economic Power (1946);
United States Versus Economic Concentration, Report to Monopoly Sub-
committee of the Committee on Small Business, 79th Cong. (1947) ; compare.
Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise (1951). Also see The
Minneapolis Star, Apr. 22, 1953, p. 30 which reports: "American industry
rounded out an unprecedented decade of expansion in 1952 with a record
number of billion-dollar corporations, according to a United Press survey."
The number of such corporations is now 66, more than double the number
of 11 years ago.
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However, this does not necessarily indicate anything as to the
consequences for competition of such concentration. Figures of con-
centration for the economy as a whole are not very helpful at this
point. It is necessary to distinguish measures which indicate con-
centration of economic power in the economy as a whole, those
which indicate concentration in a partciular market and those
which relate directly to dominance of a market or monopoly power.
These concepts may be, and undoubtedly are related; but they are
not identical. Unfortunately we do not have any objective indicia of
monopoly which are applicable to such data. No one is in a position
to say whether there is more or less competition where a single
large producer, for example, with 25% of market sales is in the
same market with a large number of small producers, or where
there are few relatively large producers of equal size-say three or
four-which split the market approximately equally. It may very
well be that there is no categorical answer, and that the judgment
must vary from market to market depending not only on the dis-
tribution or concentration of assets and sales but also on dynamic
factors of behaviour.
We may, nevertheless, assume that the figures as to the concen-
tration of economic power indicate some lessening of competition
although it is impossible to postulate any quantitative correlation.
Does this assumption support the conclusion that the antitrust laws
have not been effective? Again the conclusion is dubious. It is
certain that the tendency toward economic concentration and most
of the forces supporting it had been initiated before passage of the
antitrust laws. It is also clear that during the first three or four
decades after passage of the Sherman Act there was relatively
feeble enforcement effort.'5 3 Then there are a number of facts
indicating that antitrust has been relatively effective despite the
apparent trend toward concentration. First, there is the obvious
fact that competition has by no means disappeared from the Ameri-
can economy in spite of the strength of the forces operating in favor
of concentration. It is not even clear that concentration has in-
creased substantially since the Berle and Means study in 1932.194
Second, is the fact that although concentration in the economy as a
whole appears not to have diminished much, there have been notable
changes both in the relative size and position of particular enter-
prises and also in the concentration existing in specific markets. 95
193. See references cited in note 192 supra.
194. Note 20 supra.
195. See The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 24, reporting a study of
changes in the top 100 United States industrial corporations, between 1909
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Finally, there is the testimony of big business itself. If the argu-
ments of the pro-big apologists demonstrate nothing else, they show
concern over the operation of the antitrust laws which is more than
simply academic. More direct is the statement of the staff of the
Brookings Institution. After a five-year investigation of the one
hundred largest industrial corporations during a forty-year period,
it was concluded that change is characteristic not only of positions
among the 100 top corporations, but also of industries represented
by them and of positions within an industry and activities of the
corporations. As a partial explanation it was stated:
"Undoubtedly restraint-of-trade prosecutions by antitrust
authorities since the mergers of fifty-odd years ago and the sub-
sequent 'trust-busting' era played a role. The evidence would in-
dicate that fear of prosecution and desire to conform with pre-
vailing standards of business morals played an even greater
role." 96
There is some reason to think that the tendency of the last
decades has been toward a less active and lively competition in
pricing. There has surely been a marked diminution of price ad-
vertising in recent years. However, this may easily be due prin-
cipally to the constant inflationary pressures during the entire
decade. It may also signal a shift in emphasis from short-term to
long-term price competition in particular fields. It is certainly too
early to pass judgment on this issue.
It may be worth noting that at least one reputable if unconven-
tional economist, the late Joseph Schumpeter, took the position
that industrial concentration has been exaggerated, and that com-
petition has never been as effective and prevalent as in the present
era.1
9 7
In the final analysis, it is impossible to find any objective criteria
by which to say whether or not the antitrust laws have been as
effective as they might or should have been. Clearly they have
had some effect; but how much? The answer is bound to be at
least partially the intuitive response of the one who undertakes to
pass judgment. Stocking and Watkins, two of the most able and
impartial students of the subject, conclude that it cannot be said
that the antitrust laws have been a complete success, but it can
be said that they have not been a complete failure. 198
and 1948 made by the Brookings Institution. It should be said that this study
does not seem to support the conclusions which the report seeks to draw from
it. It is, however, cited as suggestive of such data. Compare the study of the
FTC reported in The New York Times, Aug. 24, 1949, p. 37.
196. The New York Times, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 24.
197. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 81,
140 (1942, rev. ed. 1947).
198. Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 547 (1951).
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It seems quite plausible to me to take the view that antitrust
has been a rather notable success. The judgments of most critics
seems to rest upon figures reflecting conditions of concentration or
comparisons of the economy of this 'country at different periods.
But such data do not not seem logically to support any inferences
of this sort. Since we are obviously dealing with a phenomenon
which has been and is in the process of dynamic growth and change
over the period of the last century as the result of numerous forces
and influences, comparisons involving our own status at different
times during that period hardly give logical support to any infer-
ences as to the influence of a single cause in such changes as are thus
observed. If we wish to test the effectiveness of a specific factor in
influencing the direction or rate of change, it is necessary to make
a comparasion with some other economic system that is subject
to the same basic forces but which lacks the factor under con-
sideration.
Fortunately this is not difficult. Our antitrust laws have no real
counterpart in any other country. This does not mean that we can
validly compare ourselves to any other country in the world. Lilien-
thal seeks to compare America with the backward countries of the
middle east, Latin America and Asia. 9 9 Since we are vastly better
off than they, and since we have big business and they do not, he
concludes that we owe our present condition of welfare to big busi-
ness. It would be quite as logical to note that America has an anti-
trust law, that the backwards countries of other parts of the world
do not have an antitrust law, and that therefore, our welfare is due
to our antitrust law.
Clearly, however, to make a valid comparison between this and
another country, we must choose one that is at least roughly com-
parable in resources and industrial development. It is, therefore,
much more to the point to make a comparison of this country and
those of western Europe. The chief difference between the industrial
system of this country and that of Europe has, indeed, been the
existence of antitrust laws in this country and the existence of the
"cartel" system in Europe. It is, accordingly, not unreasonable to
credit the antitrust policy for much of the accomplishment that
made American industry superior to European even before the war.
This is one answer also (if any answer is needed beyond the data
as to the actual growth of business) to those occasional faint sugges-
tions that antitrust is unduly hampering the growth of American
business. This country is not distinguished from the other indus-
199. David Lilienthal, Big Business: A New Era 114, 125, 203 (1953).
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trialized countries of the world by the size of its industry-there
were and are many enterprises in western Europe and Britain
which are of comparable size to corresponding enterprises in this
country. America is distinguished from the other industrialized
countries by its antitrust policy and its insistence on competition.
If there is any single factor in our economy other than geography
and natural resources which deserves credit for our condition of
prosperity and welfare, it would appear to be the insistence on
competition. Not big business but competition is America's greatest
economic resource.2 0 0 Considering the pressures that have existed
for the restriction of competition and the degree to which other
industrial countries have succumbed to such pressures, the achieve-
ment of the antitrust policy in maintaining and restoring the degree
of competition now existing in this country should be reckoned
as monumental. It would be foolhardy or ignorant to call any law a
"complete success." Yet even a cautious appraisal will give the anti-
trust laws credit for a very large measure of success.
The dangers of such a judgment are not so much that it may be
retrospectively erroneous as that it may be prospectively too com-
placent. The tendency toward concentration (sometimes called
centralization), the pressures to restrict competition and the drives
toward monopoly are all as potent today as ever before in history.
If there is any truth at all in the conclusion that our welfare is due,
in any degree, to the antitrust policy, then the need for that policy
continues and increases. However, just as economic conditions,
structures and theories change, so must the applications and inter-
pretations of the antitrust policy. The courts have come to see that
in the application of the antitrust policy they must resort to eco-
nomic criteria. But, as Keynes has observed, "Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influ-
ences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economists.' - ,oa Even
those who consciously submit to intellectual influences are likely to
be more impressed by the thoughts of one now dead and famous than
those of some contemporary who has not yet been generally
acclaimed.
Herein lies much danger for the law. The system of decision by
precedent in itself makes for a backward-looking viewpoint and
tends to inhibit the reception of current ideas.2 1 But such an attitude
200. Compare R. T. Haslam, Competition Is an American Resource,
Reader's Digest, Jan. 1948, p. 132. Mr. Haslam is vice-president of the
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey.
200a. Keynes, op. sit. supra note 96, at 383.
201. Loevinger, An Introduction to Legal Logic, 27 Ind. L. J. 471
(1952).
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would be, or will be, fatal in the enforcement of antitrust laws. The
classical model of the economic system is no longer a safe stand-
ard by which to judge dangerous or anti-social practices. As the
new economists have pointed out, competition is constantly chang-
ing in operation, form and appearance. It exists as a matter of
degree and it is an evolving characteristic of the economic system.
Just as competition is changing and evolving, so are the re-
straints on competition and so is monopoly. Restraint of trade and
monopoly are as various in their manifestations as competition
itself. Monopoly can no longer be identified simply by the level
of prices or the pattern of price variation in a market.20 2 There
is no single or simple economic test for judging monopoly or
monopolistic tendency. The courts must resort to all the tools and
concepts of economic analysis if they are to perform adequately
in this field.
The functional analysis between horizontal and vertical agree-
ments is a familiar one.20 3 The courts have referred to it, but have
not seemed to know what significance to attach to it. The economic
analysis should be suggestive here. All economists are agreed that
the domination of a market by a few sellers who act collusively is
equivalent to monopoly.20 4 It is also clear that the danger of subtle
or tacit agreement is much greater in the market of few sellers
than where there are many. It is also apparent that competition in
a modem market involves many elements other than price.
The courts have recognized the dangers in price-fixing agree-
ments by declaring them unreasonable per se. In this they have not
distinguished between horizontal and vertical agreements, but have
brought all within the same ban. The same considerations which
dictate that price-fixing should be illegal per se, with similar force
argue that all horizontal agreements relating to matters which are
or should be competitive, must be declared illegal (or unreasonable)
per se. Perhaps this is already the holding of the courts. Some of the
Supreme Court opinions seem to look this way. But the rule is not
so clear that it is beyond doubt, and does not serve as the impera-
tive warning that it should be.
On the other hand, there must be a distinction here between
horizontal and vertical agreements. There is no reason why com-
petitors should agree upon services to be rendered or quality to be
maintained or any other element of that which is sold to their cus-
tomers. But there may be good reasons why manufacturers or dis-
202. Corwin D. Edwards, Maintaining Competition 125-126 (1949).
203. Loevinger, The Law of Free Enterprise 69 et seq. (1949).
204. Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 305 (1951).
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tributors should be able to require retailers to maintain standards
of service or quality, even though they are not similarly privileged
as to price generally. The rule of reason should be explicated to
indicate that in general, reasonable contracts or combinations are
those along the vertical lines of distribution, but that horizontal
combinations or agreements are abnormal and unreasonable, and
not to be permitted except as to particular subjects which are not
properly competitive matters.
The courts must also be sensitive to the fact that the greater the
number of substitutes or classes of commodities controlled by one
or a few sellers, the greater the market power and the more monopo-
listic the tendency. Similarly, the analysis as to original and coun-
tervailing power suggests a discrimination which has not yet ap-
peared in the decisions. On the other hand, the distinction between
"close" and "loose" combinations, which some legal text writers
favor, does not have any functional significance worthy of con-
sideration.
Perhaps the most significant single criterion which the courts
can use in cases involving antitrust questions is that of market
behaviour. Corwin Edwards, one of the most astute economists in
this field, suggests that variations in market conduct should be the
test of whether or not competition exists.205 Actually the decisions
have tended to approach this principle. While the law in terms re-
quires a showing of combination or conspiracy to establish violation,
the courts have been willing to infer conspiracy from substantial
unanimity or concert of action.20  This is simply the converse of
the principle proposed by Edwards. Variation in market conduct
will be taken to show competition; its absence will be the basis for
inferring conspiracy.
The reason that even such an apparently simple standard as this
will not solve the problems of antitrust enforcement is that eco-
nomic criteria are no more self-enforcing or self-applying than legal
principles. What does or does not in any case constitute variation
on the one hand, or concert or substantial unanimity of action on
the other, will not always be an easy decision. The attitude with
which the case is approached will make much difference. The courts,
after all, are merely judges; and many judges still suffer from an
attitude of ambivalence in the application of the antitrust laws to
205. Corwin D. Edwards, Maintaining Competition 128 (1949).
206. United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U. S. 131 (1948);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U. S. 781 (1946); Interstate
Circuit v. United States, 306 U. S. 208 (1939); Loevinger, The Law of
Free Enterprise 315 and cases cited (1949).
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business men. Most judges are, like most business men, devoted to
the principles of free enterprise and competition. But they are
reluctant to see "respectable" business men of the community, or
of another community, as criminals, and conspiracy still has much
of the flavor of crime about it. To "infer conspiracy" is still a diffi-
cult psychological hurdle for a judge to jump in an antitrust case.
Yet restraint of trade and monopolizing are indubitably as anti-
social in their nature as tax-evasion or embezzlement. In their effect
upon *victims and their impact on society they are far more anti-
social and reprehensible than the ordinary legal offenses.
Probably if the courts can bring themselves to consider these
matters in terms of economic rather than moral or legal judgments
they may be able to deal with them more objectively. It may not
be as difficult to observe lack of variation in market conduct as it
is to infer conspiracy from concert of action. Indeed, there may
even be some substantive difference since the economic test re-
quires no more than observation of objective conduct; while the
conspiracy test requires that there be at least a reasonable suspicion
of some clandestine meeting or subjective agreement. This shift in
emphasis should require no change in substantive law, for the Su-
preme Court has also said that acquiescence in a common course of
conduct is equivalent to agreement upon it.217
The basic provisions of the antitrust laws are surely both ade-
quate and admirably adapted to the purpose for which they were
intended. Of course they are not self-executing, any more than the
provisions of any other law. No economic principle or test can make
them self-executing. The laws will be and must be administered by
judges who will in the future, as many have in the past, commit
errors of judgment and decide cases contrary to the ideas of many
not on the bench, and even of some on the same bench. One at-
tempting to understand as controversial a field of law as this must
be particularly careful not to be influenced by disapproval or dis-
appointment at the holding in a particular case or cases to the ex-
tent of casting out principles which are capable of being soundly
applied. Undoubtedly the judges now on the bench, if called upon
to re-examine some of the cases decided in the past, would reach
different conclusions as to the facts from the same record and the
same principles as those used originally.
This emphasizes again that attitude is of crucial importance in
this field. The principles enunciated in antitrust decisions have, on
the whole, been both practical and theoretically sound. Yet it is the
207. See cases cited in note 206 mtpra.
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judgment of competent and impartial scholars that the Supreme
Court has shown distinctive reluctance relentlessly to adapt its
interpretation of the antitrust laws to the requirements of an effec-
tively competitive economy. 208 That the antitrust policy has been
as effective as it has is probably due as much to voluntary compli-
ance by business as to rigorous enforcement by the courts. But the
two are not separable. Business looks to the courts for its attitude
toward the law. If the courts are hesitant, stereotyped or reluctant
about enforcement, business will be indifferent about compliance; if
the courts are rigorous, realistic and sophisticated in their inter-
pretation and application of the law, business will be meticulous
and conscientious in compliance.
There is less security for the individual enterprise in competition
than in monopoly; and there is less comfort in facing a program of
vigorous law enforcement than one of official indifference. But both
the individual and society have a priceless stake in maintaining
competition and the social policy which supports it. Such insecurity
is the price of freedom. The newer economic theories give us much
information about formerly obscure aspects of our economy. They
make available to the law new and powerful intellectual tools for
analyzing and controlling modern market conditions. Ultimately
they confirm rather than alter the fundamental principle of our
economic, and political faith: the maintenance of competition and
of our antitrust policy is an essential (even if not, by itself, suffi-
cient) condition for the preservation of our economic and political
freedom.
208. Stocking and Watkins, Monopoly and Free Enterprise 312 (1951).
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